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ARTICLES
REPUBLICAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND
TEA PARTY PATRIOTS: A PUBLIC CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL TERM
LIMITS
KEITH J. LARSONt
INTRODUCTION
James Madison warned that constitutional amendments
rooted in the fleeting passions of the people, not their prudence,
could undermine the stability of the Republic.' He feared that
turning ordinary political disputes into constitutional crises
would, "in great measure, deprive the government of that
veneration which time bestows on everything, and without which
perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the
requisite stability."2 Specifically, with regard to restricting who
may seek election to Congress, Madison hoped that the few
qualifications enumerated in the Constitution' would remain
unchanged and immune from political exploits. He insisted that
"[the qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental
I J.D., 2008, University of Maryland School of Law; B.A., 2003, The College of
William & Mary. The Author is an associate at the law firm of Elderkin & Pirnie,
PLC in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
The author would like to thank Professor Maxwell L. Stearns, Professor of Law
and Marbury Research Professor at The University of Maryland Carey School of
Law, for his comments on the initial draft of this Article.
I THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 310-14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003).
2 Id. at 311.
The Qualifications Clause regarding Representatives states, "No Person shall
be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and
been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
The Clause on Senators is the same, except that it sets a minimum age of thirty and
a period of citizenship of nine years. Id. § 3, cl. 3.
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articles in a Republican Gov[ernment] and ought to be fixed by
the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of
either, it c[ould] by degrees subvert the Constitution.""
Between 1990 and 1994, more than two hundred years after
Madison spoke these cautionary words, a furor of anti-incumbent
sentiment' stirred the voters of twenty-two states to pass
legislation imposing term limits on members of Congress.6 Many
legal scholars consider it to be the largest grassroots movement
in recent American history.7 At the same time, leading up to the
1994 midterm elections, congressional term limits served as a
key campaign issue in the Republican Revolution's "Contract
with America."' Then, in 1995, a narrow five-to-four majority of
the United States Supreme Court held in U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton that any changes with respect to congressional term
limits may only be made through the amendment procedures set
forth in the Constitution.9 If the qualifications listed in the
Constitutiono are to be altered, the Constitution itself must be
4 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 533-34 (1969) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 249-50 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
' See Martha Angle, Initiatives: Vox Populi or Professional Ploy?, 52 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 2982, 2982 (1994) (observing that the term limits movement of the early
1990s was fueled by anti-incumbent feelings towards members of Congress).
6 See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-
Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 624 n.1 (1996) (listing the twenty-two state
laws enacting federal term limits).
I See, e.g., Walter M. Frank, Individual Rights and the Political Process: A
Proposed Framework for Democracy Defining Cases, 35 S.U. L. REV. 47, 89 (2007)
("In terms of practical impact, it is hard to overstate the importance of U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, for it stopped in its tracks the movement for congressional
term limits, perhaps the most significant grass roots democratic reform movement
since the Progressive Era."); Jeffrey A. Karp, Explaining Public Support for
Legislative Term Limits, 59 PUB. OPINION. Q. 373, 373 (1995) ("Not since the tax
revolt swept across the country in the late 1970s has the United States witnessed
such a swift and popular uprising.").
8 CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS To CHANGE THE NATION 157-61 (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) ("Our Contract with America will guarantee
the first ever vote on a constitutional amendment for term limits."); Karen Foerstel,
Term Limits Movement Strikes Out in New Direction, 58 CQ WKLY. 235, 235 (2000)(noting that term limits "dominated public discourse" in the 1990s and "helped
sweep Republicans to power in Congress").
9 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995).
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.
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amended." Accordingly, under Article V,12  the fate of
congressional term limits was to be determined by the members
of Congress.'a
Following Thornton, Republican members of Congress failed
to deliver on their campaign promise to pass a term limits
constitutional amendment. 4  Also, nearly all reneged their own
self-imposed limits.' 5  The movement appeared to have lost its
momentum. However, fifteen years later, the issue has now
resurfaced. During the 2010 congressional elections, the populist
Tea Party tapped into widespread anti-incumbent feelings to
revive public support for a proposed congressional term limits
amendment.' 6
n Thornton, 514 U.S. at 837.
12 Article V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be
made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its
equal Suffrage in the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
s In theory, Article V provides two methods of offering an amendment to the
Constitution: (1) proposal by two-thirds of both houses of Congress or (2) proposal by
a national convention called by two-thirds of the state legislatures. Id. As a practical
matter, congressional proposal by two-thirds of both houses is the likely means of
offering an amendment, given that a national convention has not occurred since the
original Constitutional Convention of 1787.
14 See Jennifer Babson, House Rejects Term Limits; GOP Blames Democrats, 53
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 918, 918 (1995); David S. Cloud, Term Limits Stall in Senate;
GOP Blames Democrats, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1153, 1153 (1996) ("A vote to shut
off debate on the term limits amendment (S[.]J[.] Res[.] 21) failed 58-42, two short of
the 60 votes necessary to invoke cloture. All 53 Senate Republicans voted for
cloture . . . .").
1I See Shawn Zeller, Term Limits: Paying To Overstay, 67 CQ WKLY. 2568, 2568
(2009) (noting that sixty-eight of the seventy-three lawmakers who took term limits
pledges broke them).
16 See Jay Newton-Small, Term Limits: No Magic Pill for Washington's Woes,
TIME.COM (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/O, 85 9 9 ,1967
192,00.html#ixzzOy7LOZAfP ("Once more, term limits has [sic] become a rallying cry
from the Tea Party movement to dozens of state initiatives that will be on the ballot
come November."); see also infra Part IV.
ST. JOHN'S LAWREVIEW [Vol. 86:761
Legal academics and politicians have long analyzed and
debated the desirability of a term limits amendment. 7
Advocates argue that office rotation prevents lawmakers from
becoming entrenched career politicians who are more interested
in retaining their political power than in representing the
people.'" Critics argue that compulsory term limits would waste
legislative experience developed through years of lawmaking19
and would actually increase the influence of special interest
lobbyists." In addition, opponents maintain that constituents
should be permitted to vote for whomever they wish."
While there is a vast body of literature contemplating the
impact term limits might have on the lawmaking process, little
attention has been focused on why lawmakers would decide to
" See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE TERM LIMITS: PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES (Bernard
Grofman ed., 1996) (compiling a collection of twenty articles written by legal
scholars regarding term limits); LIMITING LEGISLATIVE TERMS (Gerald Benjamin &
Michael J. Malbin eds., 1992); Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80
Geo. L.J. 477, 479-83 (1992); Garrett, supra note 6, at 630-34.
'8 CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION, supra note 8,
at 159 ("An entrenched body of politicians erodes Congress's accountability and
responsiveness. An enormous national debt, deficit spending, and political scandals
are but a few of the results. Although enacting term limits would not be a panacea,
it will be the first step to putting our legislative system back on track."); GEORGE F.
WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 200 (1993) ("Many Americans wish that a lot of legislators had a better
sense of American life, and particularly of what it is like to be on the receiving end of
the high-minded laws and regulations that gush like a cataract from Washington.
Term limits, guaranteeing a steady rotation of offices, would help."); Cleta
Deatherage Mitchell, Limiting Congressional Terms: A Return to Fundamental
Democracy, 7 J.L. & POL. 733, 739 (1991) (observing that term limits advocate desire
to increase turnover in Congress and replace the "career orientation" of
officeholders).
19 See Doug Bandow, Real Term Limits: Now More Than Ever, CATO INST. POL'Y
ANALYSIS, March 28, 1995, available at http//www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-221.html
(reporting that Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich argued that "[a] six-year
learning curve is just too short").
20 Gary S. Becker, Reforming Congress: Why Limiting Terms Won't Work, BUS.
WK., Aug. 6, 1990, at 18 (concluding that members of Congress "will be tempted to
favor groups that can provide employment or consulting fees when their careers on
Capitol Hill are over."); Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 17, at 510-19 (arguing that
term limits force lawmakers to think about their careers after politics, which
encourages them to provide legislative benefits to their prospective employers, such
as lobbyists and governmental agencies).
21 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 819 (1995) ("Our conclusion
that States lack the power to impose qualifications vindicates the same
'fundamental principle of our representative democracy'. . . namely, that 'the people
should choose whom they please to govern them.' ").
764
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS
back passage of this procedural tool. And yet this is the pivotal
question, given that Congress is the only legislative body
authorized to send a proposed constitutional amendment to the
states for ratification.22 This Article attempts to fill this gap in
the literature. Using public choice theory23 and empirical data,2 4
this Article develops a model that allows us to better predict
when, if ever, members of Congress might act to pass a proposed
term limits constitutional amendment.
Part I places the term limits movement of the 1990s in an
historical context, recounting the underlying causes of the
Republican Revolution, the Supreme Court's opinion in Thornton,
and the eventual decline in lawmaker support for term limits.
Part II analyzes the public choice models previously applied to
the term limits discussion and their limitations and proposes a
new model. The new model submits that politician support for
term limits is strategic rather than sincere. It predicts that those
seeking election or reelection to Congress will back term limits
when both of two political circumstances exist. First, a politician
will support term limits if he or she is a member of an
historically underrepresented ideological political faction. For
example, the term limits campaign of the 1990s was launched by
conservative members of the GOP2 5 in an effort to oust tenured
Democrats and even moderate Republicans. In the decades
leading up to the Republican Revolution of 1994,
underrepresented conservatives grew frustrated because
conservative voters continued to reelect liberal Democrats due to
the many political advantages afforded incumbents.26 Since term
limits would eliminate the incumbency advantage, politicians
who are members of an ideologically underrepresented group-
such as conservative members of the GOP in the early 1990s-
stand a better chance of winning election under a term limits
regime. The GOP was confident that Democrats, stripped of the
inherent advantages of incumbency, would lose seats to
conservative Republicans-enough, they believed, to allow the
GOP to retake control of the House of Representatives for the
22 Supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
23 See infra Part II.
24 See infra Part III.
25 "GOP" is the nickname for the Republican Party and the two titles are used
interchangeably. GOP originally stood for "Gallant Old Party."
26 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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first time since 1953. The second condition has to do with voter
dissatisfaction with Congress. Both the Republican Revolution of
the 1990s and the Tea Party movement of 2010 used the term
limits issue to capitalize on the anti-incumbent mood of the
country.2 7 It is not novel to suggest that voter support for term
limits is directly correlated to the public's distrust and
disapproval of members of Congress. However, this Article is
more concerned with legislator support for term limits. It argues
that legislators will take public positions in favor of term limits
to signal to voters that they are not part of the problem in
Congress; rather, that they are attempting to fix the institution.
Politicians will use the term limits issue to wrap anti-incumbent
attitudes into a popular political platform. In short, politicians
running for office will endorse term limits when public opinion of
Congress is at its lowest.
Part III of this Article tests the validity of this strategic
model with empirical data that has not yet been applied in this
context. It also addresses the strengths and limitations of the
captured data. Part IV applies the lessons learned from the
analysis of the Republican Revolution to the current term limits
movement led by the Tea Party. It concludes that this movement
is likely to fail because the first condition of the strategic model-
that conservatives feel historically underrepresented-does not
exist.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S
In the early 1990s, conservatives believed that Congress was
ideologically out of step with the American people. Career
politicians were being reelected not because voters identified
with their views, but because of the incumbency advantage. This
advantage, which is well documented in political science
literature,2 9 includes the use of congressional staff and office
27 See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, The 1994 House Elections In Perspective, 111 POL.
SCI. Q. 203, 208 (1996) ("Republican[s] ... offered themselves as vehicles for
expressing antigovernment rage by taking up the banner of structural panaceas-
term limits, a balanced budget amendment, cuts in congressional staff and perks-
that were broadly popular... ."); Angle, supra note 5; Newton-Small, supra note 16.
28 See, e.g., JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS
PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC ArrITUDEs TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 74-
82, 121, 156 (1995).
29 For a review of the institutional and electoral advantages of congressional
incumbents, see JEFFREY M. STONECASH, REASSESSING THE INCUMBENCY EFFECT
766 [Vol. 86:761
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resources to provide valuable services to constituents (voters),
the franking privilege to finance mailings to constituents,
increased name recognition and visibility, easier access to media
coverage, and regular opportunities to provide legislative benefits
to constituents.30 In short, as Political Science Professor David R.
Mayhew points out, "[a] vital advantage enjoyed by House
incumbents is that they are much better known among voters
than their November challengers."3 ' Republican House Speaker
Newt Gingrich went so far as to say that, systematically, "'[tihe
balance of power in favor of professional politicians as
incumbents ... has made a mockery of the process of open
elections.' "32 This Article posits that the GOP, the minority
party in Congress for forty years, hoped that term limits would
procedurally eliminate this electoral advantage by forcing
incumbents from office.
This Section sets the stage for the discussion on term limits.
It begins with an analysis of the development and downfall of the
Democratic incumbency advantage. Specifically, it looks at how
Republican frustration over nearly six decades of Democratic
congressional majorities"3 and a reelection rate of ninety
percent 34  triggered the term limits movement among
conservative politicians. Next, it reviews the Supreme Court's
opinion in Thornton. Finally, with the Supreme Court holding
that the only way to impose congressional term limits is through
constitutional amendment, this Article analyzes how the GOP
fared in its attempts to propose such an amendment.
(2008); WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS 33-34 (8th ed. 2011); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL
CONNECTION 36, 50-52, 84-85 (2d ed. 2004); and EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE
RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS 152 (2003) ("Incumbency is the most powerful
resource in congressional elections.").
3o MAYHEW, supra note 29, at 50.
31 Id.
32 141 CONG. REC. 9670 (1995) (statement of Rep. Gutierrez) (quoting Rep. Newt
Gingrich).
" See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 2008, at
46-47 (2008) (reporting that, between 1931 and 1995, the Democratic Party won the
majority in the House for fifty-eight of the sixty-four years and in the Senate for fifty
of the sixty-four years).
3 Id. at 57-58.
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A. Republican Realignment and the "Contract with America"35
Nearly six decades of reigning Democratic majorities began
in 1931." The public blamed GOP President Herbert Hoover and
the Republicans in Congress for the stock market crash of 1929."
As such, economic tragedy turned voters against the Republican
Party in many congressional districts." President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's ensuing popular response to the Great Depression
and World War II secured lasting political support, laying the
base for a Democratic Party majority in the House for fifty-eight
of the subsequent sixty-four years. 39 At the same time, reelection
rates steadily increased,4 0 essentially guaranteeing Democratic
control of the country's legislative branch.
For the next sixty years, the incumbency advantage shielded
Democrats from serious Republican challengers.4 1 Majority party
status meant Democratic members could serve as committee
chairs.42 Committee chairmanships in Congress provide the
chair with the ability to move legislation.43 Democratic
incumbents could thus advertise to voters that they were in a far
better position to provide legislative benefits than were their
Republican contenders. Incumbent members took credit for
popular governmental programs.4 4 Reelection grew easier with
" For an extensive discussion and analysis of the changes in the composition of
the Republican and Democratic parties in the 1970s and 1980s, see. generally
BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL
POLICY MAKING (2006); GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE
LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 139-278 (2d ed. 2007); and BLACK
& BLACK, supra note 29.
3 See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33.
V See JEFFREY M. STONECASH, POLITICAL PARTIES MATIER: REALIGNMENT AND
THE RETURN OF PARTISAN VOTING 23 (2006).
38 Id.
39 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29, at 41-42, 56-57.
40 See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 57-58.
41 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
42 See OLESZEK, supra note 29, at 108-11.
43 Id. at 109 ("A chair who favors a bill can give it top priority by mobilizing
[committee] staff resources, compressing the time for hearing and markups, and, in
general, encouraging expeditious action by committee members.").
4 See MAYHEW, supra note 29, at 53 ("The political logic of this, from the
congressman's point of view, is that [a voter] who believes that a member can make
pleasing things happen will no doubt wish to keep him in office so that he can make
pleasing things happen in the future."); BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29 ("As
members of the majority party, often serving on key committees that handled
legislation vital to their districts, southern Democrats could represent their
constituents far better than Republicans could plausibly claim to do.").
768 [Vol. 86:761
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time as prospective Republican candidates deemed it senseless to
run for office against Democrats who had won landslide
majorities in the past."5 Defeating Democratic incumbents had
become all but impossible.46
This Democratic dominance was strongest in the southern
states.47 Immediately after the Civil War, southerners aligned
themselves with the Democratic Party because the GOP's
Reconstruction economic agenda tended to benefit northern
industry at the expense of the more agrarian South.48 Dubbed,
the "Solid South," 49 electoral support of Democratic candidates
endured until the 1980s. 0 By the early 1940s, however, public
support for the New Deal had faded. Conservative southern
Democrats began caucusing with Republicans who opposed the
New Deal." This bipartisan coalition began to divide along party
lines in the mid-1960s.5 2 The GOP's opposition to the Civil
Rights Act,53 and the nomination of Barry Goldwater as the
GOP's presidential candidate-a man who "reveled in the title
'Mr. Conservative' "54-attracted conservative southern
Democrats to the Republican Party. Despite losing at the
national level to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Goldwater had
effectively advanced the conservative Republican agenda
throughout the South. 5 Conservative voters who had previously
aligned with southern Democrats were now backing
Republicans. 6 The Democratic Party became more liberal,"
" See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29, at 152-71.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 152. For the purposes of this Article, the "southern states" include
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
I Id. at 11-12.
4 Id. at 11.
5o Id. at 13.
51 See STONECASH, supra note 37, at 24-26.
52 Id.
53 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29, at 76.
" See Julie Cart, Arizona, Washington Memorialize Goldwater, L.A. TIMES,
June 4, 1998, at A20 ("Goldwater reveled in the title 'Mr. Conservative' and has been
given credit for reviving and reshaping the Republican Party. His ideas about less
government and a strong military helped launch the political career of Ronald
Reagan, among others.").
55 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29, at 33, 127; Cart, supra note 54.
66 See STONECASH, supra note 37, at 28-31.
57 Id.
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while the GOP grew more conservative. 5  At the same time,
conservatism was growing, both regionally and at the national
level, as significantly more Americans identified themselves as
more conservative than liberal."9 Unfortunately for the GOP,
this swell in conservatism did not change results at the
congressional ballot box. As late as 1984, more than sixty-two
percent of southerners voted for the GOP's conservative
presidential candidate Ronald Reagan while fewer than forty
percent of those same voters backed the GOP's congressional
candidates.o
Republican frustration over their isolation from power came
to a head when Reagan's landslide presidential wins in 1980 and
1984 failed to yield a Republican majority in the House."
Political science professors Earl and Merle Black argue that:
Once in office, most House Republicans could make incumbency
work for them. Their principal frustration was that-as far
ahead as anyone could see-Republicans were bound to remain
the minority party in the House of Representatives. No matter
how much seniority any of them might acquire and no matter
how able or energetic any of them might be, they could not
realistically expect to chair a House committee or become part
of a majority leadership team. 62
Republicans wanted a change. A revolution was brewing.
The will for change came from the younger, more
conservative Republican members led by Representative Newt
Gingrich of Georgia."3 In the Ninety-eighth Congress (1983-
1985), Gingrich and other junior Republicans organized the
Conservative Opportunity Society" to challenge House
58 Id.
61 See infra fig.2 and accompanying text.
60 JERROLD G. RuSK, A STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE
140, 234 (2001).
1 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29, at 167.
62 Id.
6 SINCLAIR, supra note 35, at 113-16, 120.
* For a chronological account of the Conservative Opportunity Society, see ERIC
SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM 242-46 (2001) ("Gingrich played the role of
entrepreneur, aligning ideological, partisan, and power base interests behind
creation of a new type of congressional power base: an organization explicitly
dedicated to shaping public debate and sharpening partisan distinctions rather than
directly influencing House outcomes.").
770 [Vol. 86:761
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Democrats on procedural issues and resist liberal legislation."5
Minnesota Representative Vin Weber, a leading member of the
Conservative Opportunity Society, noted that the GOP had "been
too reluctant to confront in the past. A party that has been in the
minority has a tendency to become a little bit cowed ... but I'm
hard-pressed to see where compromise has advanced the
Republican agenda."6 6
The House Republicans later elected Gingrich as their
minority whip, bypassing the more moderate and more senior
minority leader, Representative Bob Michel of Illinois. This
was a sign that conservatism was on the rise. Gingrich centered
the GOP's 1994 campaign strategy on a conservative national
agenda, the "Contract with America." The Contract outlined
what bills the Republicans would attempt to pass if the voters
awarded them a majority in the House, including tax cuts, term
limits, social security reform, tort reform, and welfare reform.6 9
United behind the Contract, conservative Republican incumbents
and challengers achieved the first election of a GOP majority in
the House since 1953.10 In 1994, the nation ousted a record
number of senior Democratic incumbents in favor of Republican
rookies.'
B. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
By the end of the 1994 elections, nearly half of the states had
imposed term limits on their United States Representatives and
Senators. Perhaps the most notable of these states, Arkansas,
65 See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy,
and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives,1971-2000, 47
AM. J. POL. SCI. 305, 307 (2003) ("Vote no and sharpen the criticism was the theme-
a 'rule or ruin' strategy, it was dubbed by one House Republican.").
I Diane Granat, Splits in Style, Substance: Deep Divisions Loom Behind House
GOP's Apparent Unity, 43 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 535, 536 (1985).
67 See BLACK & BLACK, supra note 29, at 398 (describing the rise of House
Speaker Newt Gingrich within the GOP House leadership).
I Id.; see CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH,
REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION, supra
note 8, at 398.
69 See generally CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT
GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE
NATION , supra note 8.
7o See ORNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 46-47.
71 Id. at 54 (reporting that Republicans experienced a net party gain of fifty-two
House seats, which was the GOP's greatest gain since 1946).
72 See Garrett, supra note 6.
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adopted Amendment 73 to its State Constitution.7 ' Amendment
73 prohibited the name of a candidate for Congress from
appearing on the ballot if that candidate had already served three
terms in the House or two terms in the Senate.4 The measure
also placed term limits on state executives 5 and legislators.7 6
The people of Arkansas had declared:
[Ellected officials who remain in office too long become
preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties as
representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has
reduced voter participation and has led to an electoral system
that is less free, less competitive, and less representative than
the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore, the
people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein
limit the terms of elected officials.
On November 13, 1992, Bobbie Hill, on behalf of herself and
similarly situated Arkansas citizens, residents, taxpayers, and
registered voters, and the League of Women Voters of Arkansas,
filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to invalidate
Amendment 73.78 Hill alleged, in part, that the amendment
violated the United States Constitution.7 9 The issues eventually
presented to the Supreme Court were "whether the Constitution
forbids States [from] add[ing] to or alter[ingl the qualifications
specifically enumerated in the Constitution"8 0 and "if the
Constitution does so forbid, whether the fact that Amendment 73
is formulated as a ballot access restriction rather than as an
outright disqualification is of constitutional significance.""'
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens addressed three
main points: (1) whether the Constitution's Qualifications
Clauses82 set forth the exclusive qualifications for membership in
Congress;83 (2) whether states have constitutional authority to
73 ARK. CONST. amend. 73.
7 Id. amend 73, § 3.
15 Id. amend 73, § 1(b).
7 Id. amend 73, § 2.
n Id. amend 73, pmbl.
78 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Ark. 1994), affd sub
nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
7 Id.
" Thornton, 514 U.S. at 787.
81 Id.
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 2, 3.
' See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 789, 796, 798 (reaffirming the Court's holding in
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
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amend said qualifications;" and (3) whether term limits are in
fact a "qualification" as defined by the Qualifications Clauses."
The majority opinion resolved the first issue using both an
historical analysis of the Framers' intent86 and what the Court
referred to as a "[r]eliance on [democratic [p]rinciples."8 7  It
concluded "that, with respect to Congress, the Framers intended
the Constitution to establish fixed qualifications."8 Stevens
looked to the Framers' debates to determine their intent. His
opinion recognized "that the post-Convention ratification debates
confirmed that the Framers understood the qualifications in the
Constitution to be fixed and unalterable by Congress."" The
Constitutional Convention itself expressly rejected proposals to
allow Congress to unilaterally amend qualifications.90 It also
expressly refused to impose "rotation," which would have
required that incumbents abstain from running for reelection for
a term before running again.91 The majority opinion also rested
on democratic principles. The Supreme Court emphasized that
"the opportunity to be elected [should be] open to all."92 The
Court observed the "'fundamental principle of our representative
democracy' . . . [is] that 'the people should choose whom they
please to govern them.' "" As such, the Supreme Court decided
that the Constitution's Qualifications Clauses set forth the sole
qualifications for membership in Congress. These qualifications
could only be altered if the text of the Constitution itself was
amended.
Second, the Court resolved that, under the Tenth
Amendment, the states did not have the authority to add to or
alter the qualifications already provided in the Constitution.94
The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."95
8 Id. at 806, 808, 816, 818-22, 827.
86 Id. at 828-36.
86 Id. at 792-93.
17 Id. at 793.
* Id. at 792-93.
8 Id. at 791.
90 Id. at 790, 811-13, 825-27.
Id. at 812-14.
92 Id. at 794.
9 Id. at 783 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)).
' Id. at 798, 800-06, 814-16, 822, 827.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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In Thornton, the majority pointed out that a power is not
reserved to the states simply because it is not expressly
delegated to the federal government. Rather, "the states can
exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of
the existence of the national government."" "With respect to
setting qualifications for service in Congress, no such right
existed before the Constitution was ratified." Therefore, "the
power to add qualifications is not within the 'original powers' of
the States, and thus is not reserved to the States by the Tenth
Amendment."" Consequently, states do not have the ability to
add to or alter the qualifications enumerated in the federal
Constitution."
Third, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' argument
that "even if States may not add qualifications, Amendment 73 is
constitutional because it is not such a qualification."00 The
petitioners submitted that congressional term limits were not a
"qualification" because they d[id] not expressly prohibit a
congressional candidate from being elected.'0' Section three of
Amendment 73 "provide[d] that certain Senators and
Representatives shall not be certified as candidates and shall not
have their names appear on the ballot. They [could] run as
write-in candidates and, if elected, they [could] serve."10 2 Those
who supported term limits "contend [ed] that only a legal bar to
service creates an impermissible qualification, and that
Amendment 73 [was] therefore consistent with the
Constitution."0 3
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning because the
"intent and the effect of Amendment 73 [were] to disqualify
congressional incumbents from further service."'o In the Court's
" Thornton, 514 U.S. at 802 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 627 (3d ed. 1858)).
9 Id. at 803.
98 Id. at 800.
99 Id.
oo Id. at 828.
1o Id.
10 Id.
103 Id.
101 Id. at 786 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark.
1994), affd sub nom. Thornton, 514 U.S 779).
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view, "Amendment 73 [was] an indirect attempt to accomplish
what the Constitution prohibits Arkansas from accomplishing
directly."10
A dissenting opinion was submitted by Justice Thomas,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. 0
Justice Thomas, writing the dissent, likewise relied on
"democratic principles."'0 7  "It is ironic," Justice Thomas
observed, "that the [majority] base[d its] decision on the right of
the people 'to choose whom they please to govern them.' >>1as The
Constitution does not deny the states "the power to prescribe
eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent
them in Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on this
question. And where the Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to
action by the States or the people."' The Arkansas electorate,
Thomas stated, "believe [d] that incumbents would not enjoy such
overwhelming success if electoral contests were truly fair-that
is, if the government did not put its thumb on either side of the
scale."" 0 He pointed out that the majority opinion-based upon
its own democratic principles-had overturned sixty percent of
the voters in Arkansas who had approved the ballot initiative."'
Thornton effectively struck down state-mandated term limits
in nearly half of the states. If the requisite qualifications of
members of Congress are to be changed, the text of the
Constitution must be changed. Advocates for term reform would
now have to turn their attention toward passing a constitutional
amendment.
C. From Campaigns to Congress
In the 1990s, political pressure was mounting and the
American people wanted term reform. A poll conducted at the
time found that seventy-three percent of Americans supported a
measure that would impose term limits on members of
Congress." 2 The Republican leadership had promised to honor
105 Id. at 829.
10 Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1o7 Id. at. 866.
'0 Id. at 845.
1o9 Id.
n0 Id. at 924.
n.. Id. at 845.
112 See Robert D. Novak, Term Limits: The Will of the People?, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 31, 1995, at Opinion 1.
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this support by holding a vote on term limits. 113 In fact, the GOP
had won its majority status in 1994 based, in part, upon their
promise to the people that they would deliver on this issue.114
Nonetheless, passing term limits was the only promise the
signatories of the "Contract with America" were unable to
keep. 15
Amending the Constitution requires that two-thirds of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate vote in favor of a
proposed amendment."' On March 29, 1995, the House fell short
and voted 227-204 to approve a proposed constitutional
amendment limiting members to twelve years in each
chamber.'1 7  This was sixty-one votes short of the two-thirds
margin necessary. Congressional journalist Jennifer Babson
observed that throughout the floor debate, "Democrats were
joined by a cadre of senior Republicans who chastised their
younger colleagues for embracing what they dubbed as a poll-
driven effort.""18 The Republicans who opposed the amendment
were those who stood the most to lose by the enactment of term
limits. Thirty of the forty Republicans who opposed the bill were
either chairs of a committee or a subcommittee, which are
positions of coveted power reserved for the most senior members
of the majority party."'
In the Senate, a vote to end debate and hold a vote on the
term limits amendment failed 58-42, two short of the sixty votes
necessary.120 Every Senate Republican voted to end the debate
and bring the amendment to the floor for a vote.121 Republican
Senators outwardly acknowledged that they were voting in favor
of the amendment knowing that it would fail.122 They cast their
votes strategically, in order to win favor among their constituents
n1 CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION , supra note 8
157-59.
114 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11 See Assessing the 104th Congress: What Passed and What Didn't, 54 CONG.Q. WKLY. REP. 3120, 3120-21 (1996).
116 See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
n1 See Babson, supra note 14.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Cloud, supra note 14.
121 Id.
122 Id.
776 [Vol. 86:761
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS
who strongly backed the measure.12 3 Some, like Senate Majority
Leader Bob Dole, voted in favor of the bill, despite later
admitting his opposition to term limits.124
Republican members blatantly flip-flopped on the issue. The
highest ranking member of the GOP, House Speaker Gingrich,
called term limits a "terrible idea"'25 in 1991, championed the
issue during the 1994 elections,1 26 and then opposed term limits
in 1995, saying "a six-year learning curve is just too short."27
Likewise, sixty-eight of the seventy-three lawmakers who took
term limits pledges, promising their constituents that they would
serve a set number of terms, broke them.12 8 Refusing to honor
their promise suggests that lawmakers never truly intended to
do so. Moreover, the openly strategic voting calls into question
whether lawmakers who publicly backed the measure ever hoped
it would become law. The focus of the next section of this Article
is to further explain these seemingly inconsistent political
positions. Part II applies the tenets of public choice theory to
shed important new light on why lawmakers took such contrary
positions on whether to weave this politically divisive issue into
the fabric of the Constitution.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA, AND
TERM LIMITS
This Part uses public choice theory to try to explain why
politicians adopted disjointed positions on an issue that the
Supreme Court feared could have "trivialize [d] the basic
principles of our democracy." 2 9 It begins with an overview of the
relevant public choice tools. Then, it analyzes the strengths and
weaknesses of the public choice models previously applied to the
term limits discussion. Finally, it offers a new model, which
123 Id.
124 Id. ("[Senator] Dole himself conceded that 'I've been lukewarm to the idea for
some time.' But he added that he was willing to send the amendment to the states
for ratification, which requires the assent of three-quarters of the state
legislatures.").
125 See Bandow, supra note 19.
126 CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION, supra note 8,
at 181-96.
127 See Bandow, supra note 19.
128 See Zeller, supra note 15.
129 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1996).
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posits that congressional support for term reform during the
Republican Revolution was strategic and not sincere. It submits
that certain political conditions prompt politicians to back term
limits. Absent these conditions, legislators lack sufficient
incentive to support self-imposed term restrictions.
A. Public Choice Theory130
Professors Maxwell L. Stearns and Todd J. Zywicki define
public choice theory as "a discipline that marries the tools of
economics with the subject of political science."' It has
"emerged a dominant force in modern legal scholarship and
jurisprudential analysis." 32 Stearns notes that public choice
draws on economics principles "to predict the types of legislation
likely to result if certain assumptions are made about the
participants in the legislative process."3 s
The central precept of public choice theory is the assumption
that all public actors-legislators, voters, bureaucrats, and
judges-behave rationally to maximize their own self-interests.134
It applies the basic behavioral assumption of economics-that
actors are rational utility maximizers-to the study of
governmental institutions.' Public decisionmaking is thus
studied through a microeconomic lens whereby laws are made by
individuals who are seeking to advance their own personal
interests. 3 1
1o For a comprehensive analysis of the study of public choice theory and its
applications to public law, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003);
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW (Daniel A. Faber & Anne
Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010); and MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD ZYWICKI, PUBLIC
CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
I1 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 130, at vii.
132 Id.
13 Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 385, 399 (1992).
134 See, e.g., LISA HEINZERLING & MARK V. TUSHNET, THE REGULATORY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS 683 (2006) ("[Tlhe premise
[of public choice theory] is that the kind of self-interested behavior one sees in
markets can also be seen in the political realm.").
"' See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5
(1978) ("Everyone recognizes that the economic approach assumes maximizing
behavior more explicitly and extensively than other approaches do, be it the utility
or wealth function of the household, firm, union, or government bureau that is
maximized.").
136 Id. at 33-38.
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While decisions made by actors do not always produce their
desired result, they are assumed to be made rationally.' This
means that actors make reasoned decisions based upon their
goals. However, where economics focuses on how markets
manipulate those decisions, public choice hones in on how
collective decisionmaking among self-interested public actors (for
example, legislators and voters) can create inefficient outcomes
for both the public and the actors themselves.' In fact, when
faced with certain incentives, actors may decide not to cooperate
even when it is in their interest to do so.' 9 For example, voters
who support term limits could theoretically cooperate with each
other by simultaneously voting out all incumbents. No district
would then stand to lose out on the legislative skills of its senior
representative, as all members would be ousted at the same time.
Yet, without coordination, each voter has an incentive to defect
from this mutually beneficial strategy and instead vote to reelect
his or her own representative with the hope that other voters will
oust their respective incumbent.140 Public choice draws on basic
economic tools, like the prisoners' dilemma game, to offer
solutions to such collective action problems.
Critics of public choice argue it is overly simplistic, myopic,
and cynical.14' The excessive focus on narrow, self-interest limits
its usefulness because more altruistic motives also shape public
policy.'14 Politicians sometimes support measures against their
m3 See James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the
Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS 7 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988). Gwartney and
Wagner state:
[Tihe men and women working in government as politicians and
bureaucrats are pretty much like their counterparts in the private sector. If
pursuit of such rewards as personal wealth, power, and prestige motivates
people in the marketplace, there is every reason to believe that these same
elements will motivate them in the political arena.
Id.
138 FABER & O'CONNELL, supra note 130, at 2 ("Individual choices in the political
sphere can create two core quandaries: lack of cooperation and problematic group
decision.") (footnote omitted).
139 Id.
140 Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 85-86
(1997).
141 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
12 For an alternative and critical scrutiny of public choice theory, see generally
DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
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own personal electoral interests in support of the "greater good."
Political scientist Steven Kelman argues: "There is the
elementary fact that political decisions apply to the entire
community. That they do so encourages people to think about
others when taking a stand. This is in contrast to making
personal decisions, when people think mainly of themselves."14 3
Even so, the usefulness of public choice does not turn
entirely on the premise that individuals are solely motivated by
personal interests. Voters and lawmakers certainly value other
goals, such as making sound public policy. To assume otherwise
would be naive. For this reason, however, public choice proves to
be all the more useful because turning even the most altruistic
ideas into sound policy necessitates an understanding of the
incentives and collective action constraints facing those who craft
policy. Therefore, here I briefly outline a few relevant
assumptions about key political players-legislators and voters-
and consider the collective action problems they may face in
attempting to enact term limits.
1. Legislators as Rational Actors
Legislators are principally motivated by reelection." The
pursuit of this single goal is attained by pleasing prospective
voters.45 Politicians may pursue additional goals, such as
gaining influence and making sound public policy, but these
goals are consistent with their reelection goals. 4 6 In fact, a
member is unable to achieve influence or craft public policy if he
or she is not reelected.' Thus, lawmakers make decisions, such
as backing or opposing legislation, based upon how those
decisions will impact their likelihood of being reelected.
Professor Mayhew argues that the electoral goal "has to be
the proximate goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved
over and over if other ends are to be entertained."'" Legislators
143 STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 22 (1987).
1" See MAYHEW, supra note 29, at 13.
145 Id. at 39.
14 See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR
DISTRICTS 137 (1978) (arguing that members of Congress have three goals-
reelection, power in Congress, and crafting sound public policy-and that securing
the first goal, reelection, allows them to attain their other two goals).
14 Id.
148 MAYHEW, supra note 29, at 16.
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undoubtedly have strong policy preferences on particular
matters. Yet, they also have a diverse body of constituents with
multifaceted agendas. A legislator's position on a particular
issue must always consider its effect on the chance of electoral
loss, as defeat would foil all future attempts to produce sound
policy in other areas. Legislators seek to curry favor with their
constituents who, in turn, vote according to their own self-
interests and reelect their incumbent members.1 49
Representatives pursue their goal of reelection through
several avenues. Three are relevant to this Article. First,
members strategically take positions on issues, through roll call
votes and public statements, to signal to voters their support of
or opposition to a measure. 50 This position-taking is strategic
and not necessarily sincere."5 ' For instance, a member who
sincerely opposes term limits, because she wants to remain in
office, may publicly support term limits if she believes such a
position will win support from her constituents and thereby help
her bid for reelection.
Second, members desire to be in the majority party.
Majority status confers certain institutional advantages.15 2
Obviously, passing legislation requires a majority of legislators to
vote in favor of it. Other advantages include: control over the
congressional agenda; the selection of all institutional leaders
(speaker, committee, and subcommittee chairs); greater influence
within all committees; and control of a disproportionate share of
staff and other legislative resources.153  Most importantly, the
149 For a comprehensive discussion on the electoral incentives facing politicians
and how those incentives shape legislator behavior, see MORRIS P. FIORINA,
REPRESENTATIVES, ROLL CALLS, AND CONSTITUENCIES 31 (1974) ("Reelection,
legislative influence, prestige, policy, higher office, public service-all may play their
part. But we would argue that reelection is the primary goal that the constituency
controls: the district gives and the district can take away."); and MAYHEW, supra
note 29, at 13-77.
'50 MAYHEW, supra note 29, at 61-73 (discussing strategic "position taking").
1 Id. at 65, 70.
152 See OLESZEK, supra note 29, at 9, 11.
1 See id.; William D. Anderson et al., The Keys to Legislative Success in the
U.S. House of Representatives, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 357, 371-72 (2003) (showing
quantitatively that being in the majority party is the only statistically significant
institutional factor that increases the number of bills a lawmaker may successfully
pass).
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majority party makes the rules for the entire institution.15 4
Political science professors Gary W. Cox and Matthew D.
McCubbins maintain that:
Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main
consequences. First, the legislative process in general-and the
committee system in particular-is stacked in favor of majority-
party interests. Second, because members of the majority party
have all the structural advantages, the key players in most
legislative deals are members of the majority party. .. .55
Thus, the extent to which a member is able to strike
legislative deals in an effort to provide benefits to his or her
constituency-which is needed for reelection-turns directly on
the ability of his or her own party to win a majority. It would
thus follow that Democrats, the party in control of Congress,
would have greater success in enacting legislation than
Republicans during that time period. The roles should reverse
when the GOP wins majority status.
Third, members desire seniority for electoral purposes. The
congressional seniority system affords privileges to members who
have served the longest, including choice of leadership positions
and committee assignments. 5 6 More senior members are better
able to land positions on committees that deal with the issues
important to their constituents. They choose committee
assignments that facilitate their need to take strategic positions
and claim credit for congressional action. This, in turn, wins
support amongst their electorate. Senior members are also in a
better position to help draft legislation such that it confers
benefits to their constituents.15 '
2. Voters as Rational Actors
This Article incorporates two assumptions about voters
found in the public choice literature. First, constituents make
voting decisions based upon a retrospective evaluation of a
candidate's performance in office.158  Public choice literature
" See OLESZEK, supra note 29, at 10-17.
66 See Cox & MCCUBBINS, supra note 35, at 2.
156 See OLESZEK, supra note 29, at 90-91.
157 Id. at 89-91.
158 See generally MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981) (submitting that voters do not contemplate how a
member will behave following an election, but, rather, constituents vote based upon
their perceptions of what candidates and parties have done in the past).
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refers to this phenomenon as "retrospective voting."15 9  Voters
want legislative benefits delivered to their own districts. They
want to know that their tax dollars are being spent in their
communities, as opposed to other parts of the country.
Retrospective voting is based upon reward-punishment theory,
meaning voters hold the incumbent member and his or her
political party responsible for what the voter deems within the
realm of governmental control.16 0
Second, this Article assumes that voters use votes to express
their opinions. e6 Much like legislators who signal their
preferences to constituents with roll call votes, constituents
express their preferences to legislators by voting for the
candidate who promises them their highest utility payoff after
the election. If candidate X promises to do more for voter A than
candidate Y, it makes sense that voter A would support X. This
is rational because voting for candidate X might help X win the
election, which is likely to bring voter A more utility than if
candidate Y were to win. Voting for X also signals support for
the issue or issues voter A supports.
This sort of "expressive voting" is particularly helpful in
explaining why a voter might decide to vote even when she
believes her single vote will not have an impact on the outcome of
the election.162 Instead of voting for the outcome, the constituent
is expressing her opinion about an issue. For example, a voter
who is extremely distrustful of Congress may strongly support
imposing term limits. Realizing that her single vote for either
candidate in her district will not alone win the election for either
candidate, she may rationally choose to throw her vote behind
the candidate who has supported term limits throughout the
campaign.163
"I See generally id.
160 Id. at 20-43.
"I See generally Morris P. Fiorina, The Voting Decision: Instrumental and
Expressive Aspects, 38 J. POL. 390 (1976).
162 Id. at 391, 393.
163 Id. at 391-93.
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3. Collective Action and the Prisoners' Dilemma Game
The prisoners' dilemma game" is an economic tool of
analysis for situations in which two parties might rationally
choose not to cooperate, even if it is in both of their interests to
do so. 165 If both parties could commit to cooperating, each would
be better off. Yet, due to the particular incentives facing the
parties, maintaining ongoing cooperation proves tricky.
The prisoners' dilemma helps to explain critical aspects of
the politics surrounding the term limits debate. There are two
prisoners' dilemma games addressed in the existing literature on
term limits: (1) the game between legislators and their
constituents16 6 and (2) the game among the states. 167 This Article
analyzes these games and then posits that there is a third, more
relevant, game played among the legislators themselves. 16 8
The theory behind the prisoners' dilemma game is
straightforward. Two players may each "cooperate" with or
"defect" from a collaborating strategy with the other player.
Each is solely concerned with maximizing his or her own utility.
For illustrative purposes, Player X and Player Y are detained by
the police. Each is interrogated in separate cells. They are
unable to communicate with each other. Each wants to minimize
his time in jail. Both are informed of the following by the
interrogating detective:
If you both confess, you will each receive a four year sentence.
If neither of you confesses, the police will charge you each with
a lesser included offense, and you will each receive a lesser two
year sentence.
If one of you confesses and agrees to testify against the other
non-confessing individual, the confessor will be released while
the other will receive the statutory maximum ten year sentence.
16 For a brief account on the history of the prisoners' dilemma and practical
illustrations of its use in the public choice discipline, see STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra
note 130, at 171-196. See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
3-26 (rev. ed. 2006).
165 See AXELROD, supra note 164; see also Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness,
Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms,
2002 Wis. L. REV. 45, 118 ("A prisoner's dilemma game is one in which both parties
would be better off agreeing to cooperate; however, the parties, for whatever reason,
cannot reach an enforceable agreement to cooperate.").
'6 See infra Part II.B.
167 See infra Part II.C.
168 See infra Part II.D.
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Figure 1 illustrates these payoffs.
FIGURE 1
Y stays silent Y betrays X
"cooperates" "defects"
X stays silent X: serves 2 years X: serves 10 years
"cooperates" Y: serves 2 years Y: is released
X betrays Y X: is released X: serves 4 years
"defects" Y: serves 10 years Y: serves 4 years
The best case scenario for each individual is to defect when
the other party cooperates. The result is a ten-year sentence for
the cooperating party and release for the defector. In contrast,
the worst outcome is to cooperate when the other party defects.
Regardless of whether Y cooperates or defects, X is always better
off defecting. The same is true for Y. Thus, each party is better
off defecting. This mutual defection leads to a scenario in which
both X and Y are each sentenced to four years. Had the parties
been able to coordinate a cooperative strategy, these sentences
would have been reduced to two years. However, since each
prisoner increases his individual payoff by defecting regardless of
what the other party does, rational actors will both choose to
defect. The rules of the game therefore produce an inefficient
result for both actors.
This inefficiency can be avoided through repeated play."'
Repetition encourages the prisoners to cooperate by providing
each with the opportunity to either punish or reward the other
party's previous play. For instance, if X cooperates on a round of
play, Y can reward this behavior by cooperating in the next
round. If, however, X cooperates and Y refuses to reward X with
cooperation, X can punish Y in the following round by defecting.
This repeated play deters defection and encourages cooperation.
16 See AXELROD, supra note 164, at 27-54 (focusing on how infinite repetition of
prisoners' dilemma game encourages cooperation).
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Game theorists surmise that if the game is played repeatedly
without a known end period, parties will eventually begin to
cooperate.170
Still, with a known end period, the prisoners end up back
where they started, with mutual defection. An iterated
prisoners' dilemma with a known end period results in what
public choice theorists refer to as "unraveling.""'1 The defection
actually begins with the final iteration of the game. Recall that
cooperation is triggered by the anticipated retribution from the
opposing player. Without the possibility of future punishment,
the players are encouraged to defect in the final round just as
they did in the single iterated game. Since the parties now
anticipate defection in the final round, there is no longer an
incentive to cooperate in the next-to-last round. As a result,
defection is the dominant strategy in the second to last round.
The same scenario continues for the preceding rounds,
"unraveling" all the way back to the first period. Thus, a known
end period changes the iterated prisoners' dilemma, such that
mutual defection becomes the dominant strategy. Predetermined
iteration does not resolve the prisoners' dilemma in the same way
infinite repetition does.
Two frequently cited law review articles apply the classic
prisoners' dilemma story to the term limits discussion. First,
Professors Linda Cohen and Matthew Spitzerl72 use the
unraveling concept to analyze how term limits impact the
electoral game played between voters and legislators. Second,
Professor Einer Elhauge looks at the game as played among the
states.7 After evaluating both models, this Article will illustrate
that there was a different "game" being played that more
accurately describes what was happening during the Republican
Revolution. Building upon the lessons learned from the term
limits movement of the 1990s, as described in Part I, this new
model allows us to better predict under what conditions
subsequent movements might succeed or fail.
170 See id.
171 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcS 216-17
(6th ed. 2012) (also referring to "unraveling" as the "endgame problem").
172 See generally Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 17.
13 See generally Elhauge, supra note 140.
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B. The Cohen and Spitzer Model: Explaining Interaction
Between Voters and Legislators
Cohen and Spitzer use the prisoners' dilemma to predict
legislator behavior following the adoption of term limits. Recall
the basic assumptions that (1) legislators desire reelection and
(2) voters want their representatives to procure legislative
benefits for the district. Based upon these two assumptions, the
Cohen and Spitzer model shapes the interaction between
legislators and voters as a prisoners' dilemma game whereby
voters cooperate by reelecting incumbents and defect by
withholding their electoral support. Incumbent lawmakers
cooperate with voters by providing legislative benefits and defect
by ignoring voters and pursuing their own personal interests.17 4
Cohen and Spitzer argue that voters and lawmakers will
both cooperate-incumbents provide "pork""'s and constituents
reelect incumbents-when the prisoners' dilemma is repeated
infinitely."' As in the basic prisoners' dilemma game, repeat
play encourages cooperation because cooperation can be
rewarded and defection can be punished."17  In the voter-
legislator game, mutual cooperation is the dominant strategy
because lawmakers seek to please their constituents in order to
secure future votes. Constituents then reward representatives
with reelection. If, instead, an incumbent "defects" by serving
her own personal interests at the expense of voters, constituents
will "defect" from the cooperative strategy and punish her by
withdrawing their support in future rounds of the game
(elections). 7 s Hence, legislators are encouraged to cooperate and
deliver pork so long as the game is repeated infinitely. This
cooperation will continue into the foreseeable future until the
legislator decides not to run for office. Cohen and Spitzer point
out that the players will cooperate so long as the prisoners'
dilemma is repeated infinitely because "failure to cooperate can
always be punished in the future.""
1" Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 17, at 498-99.
175 "Pork" or "pork-barrel" is the pejorative label for a governmental spending
project whose total costs spread across all congressional districts, but whose benefits
are to a small, concentrated population.
176 Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 17, at 504.
11 Id. at 500, 504.
17 See id.
179 Id. at 504.
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However, just as in the prisoners' dilemma illustrated
previously, a known end period changes the game. Mandatory
office rotation reduces a legislator's incentive to invest political
resources into securing pork in the final term.so No longer facing
the possibility of electoral defeat in their final term, legislators
are encouraged to defect from the strategy of mutual
cooperation.18 ' They instead pursue their personal goals and not
the desires of voters. As a result, rational voters will anticipate
this defection and decide not to elect a legislator to his or her
final term.'18
The game begins to unravel. Legislators will anticipate
voters withdrawing support. Thus, they will presume that their
next-to-last term is, in fact, their true final term. And, again,
knowing that their next-to-last term is really their final term,
they will behave differently than if they were facing the prospect
of a legitimate campaign for reelection. Legislators will spend
their next-to-last term in office pursuing their own personal
goals. Voters will anticipate this behavior and defect in the
preceding election, and so on, until legislators are only serving a
single term. 18 3 In short, term limits could encourage legislators
to ignore their constituents' interests.
Cohen and Spitzer argue that single-term unaccountable
members are an unintended drawback of term limits. According
to their model, term limits yield geographically neutral
legislators unresponsive to constituent pressure. They assume
that there is an important distinction between legislation that
benefits district voters and legislation that helps special
interests.18 4 Providing legislative benefits to constituents should
be encouraged because the government exists to serve the public.
On the other hand, pandering to special interests should be
deterred as a waste of communal resources. Term limits, they
argue, result in less of the former and more of the latter. They
conclude that term limits are undesirable because they force
legislators to ignore the electorate.
180 See id. at 508.
1 See id.
1 See id.
'3 See id. at 498-99.
18 See id. at 500-02.
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Yet, what Cohen and Spitzer underestimate is that those
who desire term limits want to restrict both special interest
legislation and localized constituent benefits."' Advocates
believe that Congress provides too much parochial pork to
constituents instead of addressing more important national
issues.86 Consider a classic example: a bridge is built in one
district in order to benefit the individuals living in that district,
but it is funded by taxes collected from all districts. Term limits
supporters oppose such federal spending. 117 While Cohen and
Spitzer posit that a legislature full of nonresponsive delegates is
an unintended consequence of term limits, it is precisely the
intended effect their supporters hope to achieve.
Still, if voters collectively want less pork, why don't they
elect legislators who produce less of it? In other words, why is it
that seventy-three percent of voters supported term limits,""8 yet
those same voters reelected ninety percent of incumbents?'8 9
Voters reelected the incumbents who were producing the pork
they so vehemently opposed. Professor Einer Elhauge addresses
this seemingly paradoxical dilemma.
C. The Einer Elhauge Model: The Voter Paradox Across State
Lines
Professor Einer Elhauge employs a prisoners' dilemma
model to resolve why voters support term limits and cast votes
for senior incumbents.190 Elhauge reasons that "there is no
inconsistency between the two votes . . . . [V]oters who wish to
oust incumbents face a collective action problem."'9 Voters know
that they will receive a greater share of legislative benefits if
their state or district is represented by a more senior
representative.12 Voters may prefer term limits as a means to
reduce pork globally, but they also know that they get more
legislative benefits when they are represented by a more senior
185 See WILL, supra note 18, at 16; Elhauge, supra note 140, at 119 (asserting
that term limits would reduce the amount of pork-barrel legislation).
186 See WILL, supra note 18, at 18 ("Today's national legislature lards the budget
with spending for parochial projects. . . .").
187 See Elhauge, supra note 140, at 117-19.
188 See Novak, supra note 112.
189 See ORNSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 33, at 57-58.
1I Elhauge, supra note 140, at 85.
191 Id.
192 See generally OLESZEK, supra note 29, at 90-91.
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member. Any attempt to coordinate by voting out all incumbents
at once would fail because voters have an incentive to "defect"
and support an incumbent to ensure that their own state receives
a greater share of government benefits. Elhauge reasons that
term limits would effectively solve this prisoners' dilemma by
forcing voters to elect new representatives. In sum, term limits
eliminate the "collective action pressures to vote for a senior
incumbent to gain a higher share of legislative clout."193
Elhauge posits that even if federal term limits are desirable
as a means to correct this collective action problem, the Supreme
Court's opinion in Thornton "makes their adoption rather
hopeless." 9 4 The Constitution may be amended if proposed by
two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by a constitutional
convention proposed by two-thirds of the state legislatures.19 5
Realistically, a proposal through Congress would appear to be
the more likely route considering the states have never united to
call for a constitutional convention. Members of Congress,
Elhauge argues, would be unwilling to impose term limits on
themselves: "If incumbent legislators have a veto on term limits,
the likelihood of getting them adopted seems as high as getting
university professors to voluntarily give up tenure."196
This Article takes issue with two of Elhauge's assumptions.
First, Elhauge assumes that incumbent legislators would never
support adopting term limits. At first glance, this assumption
makes perfect sense because we assume that legislators desire
reelection.' 7 But, it is difficult to reconcile Elhauge's assumption
with the fact that, in 1994, more than 300 congressional
candidates supported such a constitutional amendment.19 8
Further, more than half of the members of the House voted in
support of the constitutional amendment in 1994.199 Now, in
2010, the issue has resurfaced with those seeking congressional
193 Elhauge, supra note 140, at 193.
194 Id. at 111.
195 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
19 Elhauge, supra note 140, at 111-12.
197 See supra Part II.A.
198 See Holly Idelson & Kelly St. John, Candidates Seeing Term Limits As a Top
Vote-Getting Tactic, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2969, 2969 (1994) ("[More than 300
Republican House incumbents and challengers signed a highly publicized 'Contract
With America' that included a pledge to bring term limits to the House floor for a
vote in the form of a constitutional amendment.").
19 See Babson, supra note 14.
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office vowing to propose a term limits amendment if elected.200
Does this mean that members actually do not desire reelection?
The next part of this Article tackles this matter, suggesting that
support for term limits among politicians is strategic and not
sincere.
Second, Elhauge assumes that the relevant players are the
states. The states face a collective action problem that Elhauge
believes is resolved by term limits. The procedural tool frees
states-which are no longer bound to reelect incumbents due to
the rewards of seniority-to support the candidate who is
ideologically in-line with their preferences. However, in viewing
the term limits movement of the 1990s in the context of the
broader Republican Revolution, it becomes apparent that the
relevant players might have been the politicians who so
emphatically supported the measure. Federal term limits were
not, in fact, intended to free voters to record more accurate
preferences. Rather, they were proposed as a measure to
redistribute power from the Democratic majority to the
conservative GOP minority. This Article conceives a new
strategic model whereby congressional candidates did not
support term limits because they thought the country would
benefit from ousting all senior members. Instead, advocates saw
it as means to oust the members whose removal from office would
most benefit their own personal political careers.
D. A New Strategic Model: Who Are the Pertinent Prisoners?
This Article submits that the GOP supported term limits in
the 1990s for two main reasons. First, they hoped to use term
limits as a tool to oust Democrats and even more liberal
entrenched incumbents within their own party. For decades,
conservatives felt they had been underrepresented in Congress.
They hoped that term limits would resolve this situation in their
favor. Second, politicians supported term limits to capitalize on
rampant political cynicism. It was a simple way to convert public
dissatisfaction with Congress into a politically popular platform.
In both cases, support for term limits was strategic.
200 See Newton-Small, supra note 16; infra Part IV.B.
2012] 791
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
1. Thwarting the Incumbency Advantage
Political self-interest is the logic behind the strategic model.
Recall that legislators are self-interested rational actors
interested in reelection and crafting public policy that comports
with their own personal ideological views.2 01 To accomplish these
goals, it is helpful for legislators to be in the majority party
because members of the minority party face significant
procedural and political obstacles.2 02 The creation of the
Conservative Opportunity Society in 1983 by Newt Gingrich
illustrates how institutional privileges that favor one group over
another can incite political unrest.2 03 Up until 1995, Republicans
felt shut out from the congressional power structure.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, conservative Republicans
grew frustrated with a national ideological shift in their favor
that failed to yield success in congressional elections. Americans
were increasingly identifying themselves as conservative20 4 while
simultaneously reelecting incumbent liberal Democrats. 20 5 The
GOP reasoned that this was a result of the incumbent
advantage.20 6 Voters were not reelecting members based upon
their ideological platforms. Rather, voters supported incumbents
because more senior members are better equipped to bring pork
home to the district.207 Conservative challengers were
consequently discouraged from running for office. Even though
voters identified with a conservative ideology, prospective
challengers would have been outmatched by seasoned politicians.
Term limits would eliminate the incumbent advantage.
They would level the electoral playing field. The GOP was
confident that Democrats, stripped of their incumbent advantage
through mandated term limits, would lose numerous seats to
conservative Republicans.
As the 1994 election grew close, the conservative wing of the
GOP was emboldened by a growing electorate that favored its
views. Many members of the Conservative Opportunity
201 See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
203 See SCHICKLER, supra note 64, at 242.
204 See infra fig.2 and app. A.
205 See infra fig.3 and app. B.
206 141 CONG. REC. 9670 (1995) (statement of Rep. Gutierrez) (quoting Rep.
Newt Gingrich).
207 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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Society-led by Representative Gingrich-arrived in Washington
with stronger loyalties to their conservative supporters and
policies than to the more moderate Republican national
leadership. 208 As more and more conservative members were
elected to Congress, the movement grew. Still, the newly elected
conservatives repeatedly failed to constitute a majority. They
aimed to use term limits as a means to oust Democrats. This
conservative block also hoped that by ejecting even its own senior
members with term limits, it could fill those seats with more
conservative GOP legislators. This strategy would result in a
more conservative legislative body, which would generate more
conservative public policy. In sum, limiting terms would ensure
turnover, which Republicans believed would lead to an increase
in the number of GOP members elected to Congress.
2. Capitalizing on General Dissatisfaction with Congress
It is hardly an original concept to claim that dissatisfaction
with Congress can lead to voters supporting term limits. 2 09
Certainly, voters who are dissatisfied with Congress can oust
their own representatives on Election Day, but they are
powerless to cast out members from other congressional districts
and states. Term limits provide a means to eject all members.
This Article offers new insight by looking at these voter
preferences through the lens of Thornton. Regardless of public
support for a constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court
effectively took the issue out of the voters' hands and placed it
squarely with the members of Congress.2 10
Elhauge fears that legislators will never vote to impose term
limits upon themselves.2 1' Like Mayhew, he assumes that
lawmakers are rational actors who desire reelection.2 12 From this
basic assumption, Elhauge supposes that one who desires
reelection will never support term limits. Yet, Mayhew also
states that members will engage in strategic "position taking."2 13
208 See SCHICKLER, supra note 64, at 242-43.
209 See, e.g., HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 28, at 74-82.
210 Supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
211 Elhauge, supra note 140, at 111.
212 See id.
213 MAYHEW, supra note 29, at 61 (arguing that in order to earn voter support,
congressmen engage in "position taking" or "the public enunciation of a judgmental
statement on anything likely to be of interest to political actors. The statement may
take the form of a roll call vote.").
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Members will take positions publicly on issues for strategic
reasons rather than for sincere reasons. They do this
symbolically to signal support of an issue to their constituents
with the hope that it will earn votes in the upcoming election.2 14
Individuals running for office in the early 1990s supported a
term limits amendment, not because they genuinely believed it
embodied sound public policy, but because they knew it would
earn support from their constituents at a time when many
Americans wanted term limits.
The Senate's voting on term limits is especially indicative of
this sort of strategic voting. In the Senate, the general consensus
was that a proposed constitutional amendment limiting
congressional terms to twelve years would not receive the sixty
votes to end floor debate on the issue.215  Nonetheless, the
Republican leadership insisted on having a vote, so Republicans
could use their support of the measure to elicit support among
voters in future elections.2 16 Senator Fred Thompson noted that
senators "need to go on record . ... I think a lot of people who
support term limits are going to be real active in the next
election."2 17  This tactical position taking is precisely the sort
contemplated by the strategic model.
3. Summation
In short, the thesis of this Article is that politicians will
support congressional term limits when both of two conditions
are met: (1) they are members of an historically
underrepresented political faction and (2) they see a political
opportunity to package anti-incumbent sentiment into a popular
platform among voters. These two observations would be of
limited value if they only explained a brief time in American
politics between 1990 and 1994. The recent Tea Party support
for term limits, however, provides an opportunity to test the
validity of the strategic model. The model allows us to predict
how the current term limits movement might play out. This next
section uses empirical data to further evaluate the strategic
model. Part IV will then apply the lessons learned from the
strategic model to the Tea Party's support of the measure.
214 Id. at 70.
215 See Cloud, supra note 14.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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III. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC MODEL
Despite the wide-ranging literature on the normative
implications of term limits,2 18 there has been relatively little
positive analysis of the factors that influence legislative
preferences on the issue. Thus far, this Article has been an
exercise in positive theory. Following the methodological
tradition of public choice theory, it has employed a formal model
to predict legislator behavior. To make the model more precise,
this Section reduces reality to numbers. The data compiled here
further informs the strategic model's predictions about legislator
behavior.
This first part of the strategic model presumes that, in the
early 1990s, the GOP felt underrepresented in Congress. Testing
this notion involves a three step analysis. The first phase
requires quantitatively analyzing whether there was indeed a
conservative realignment among the electorate. Part of the
concept behind underrepresentation is that conservatives
believed that the electorate as a whole was more conservative
than the collective body of representatives they had elected. The
second stage of this analysis necessitates a determination as to
whether the ideological national realignment failed to translate
into GOP success in congressional races. In other words, did the
conservative public elect conservative members? The final piece
of the empirical analysis requires an investigation of support for
term limits in Congress after the GOP finally achieved a House
majority. If politicians sincerely believed that representatives
should serve a limited number of terms, we might expect to see
them voluntarily step aside after serving several terms. If,
however, their actual goal was to replace liberal and moderate
incumbents with conservative newcomers, we should expect to
see support for the measure to fizzle once the public elected a
more conservative Congress.
The second part of the model posits that Republicans used
term limits to capitalize on anti-incumbent sentiment. Testing
this part of the strategic model entails an analysis of
congressional approval ratings in the years leading up to the
Republican Revolution. These data will allow us to better
determine whether politician support for term limits was fueled
by sincere support or by GOP members who capitalized on the
218 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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anti-incumbent mood in the early 1990s. Were they sincere or
were they taking a strategic position to curry favor with their
constituents?
A. The GOP Push for Term Limits
1. Republican Realignment
A great deal has been written about the Republican
Realignment of the 1990s.21 9 Realignment arises when a political
group grows in population while remaining a minority within the
country's legislative body.2 2 0 Realignment, favoring Republicans,
began in the 1950s. 22 1 As discussed in Part I of this Article,
realignment took place for a variety of reasons, commencing in
the South.2 2 2  In the 1960s, the small-government fiscal
conservatives began to organize with social conservatives to
oppose the New Deal programs and the growing influence of the
federal government.2 23 GOP membership constituted an alliance
of fiscally conservative northern Republicans and Southern
conservatives who resisted governmental intrusion on social
issues.2 4  The GOP became known as an inclusive party,
embracing both social and fiscal conservatives. 225 This movement
culminated with the election of President Ronald Reagan.2
Political science professor Jeffrey M. Stonecash observed that
"[t]he election of Ronald Reagan was an indicator that
219 For a comprehensive summary on Republican realignment, see STONECASH,
supra note 37.
220 See, e.g., Charles S. Bullock III, Regional Realignment from an Officeholding
Perspective, 50 J. POL. 553, 554 (1988) ("In the South, for example, the Republican
party could enjoy a forty percentage point gain in the share of offices held between
1950 and 1980, yet be the minority.").
221 Id. at 570-71 ("The clearest evidence of realignment in the South comes from
presidential elections where the South has joined other regions in rejecting northern
liberals nominated by the Democratic Party.... Republican presidential success in
the 1950s begat steady gains in House delegations and growth in Senate delegations
during the 1960s and 1980s.").
222 See supra Part I.A.
223 See supra Part I.A.
224 See STONECASH, supra note 37, at 29.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 29-31.
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antigovernment conservatives were gaining influence within the
party. Reagan thought government was too big and too
intrusive, and it took too much of the people's money."227
The data tell a similar story. Figure 2 charts the growth of
conservatism using results from the American National Election
Study.2  In 1972, only eight percent more Americans identified
themselves as either "slightly conservative," "conservative," or
"extremely conservative" than those who identified as "slightly
liberal," "liberal," or "extremely liberal." By 1994, that
conservative advantage nearly tripled to twenty-two percent. As
expected, this development was also evident in the South. In
1972, twelve percent more southerners identified themselves as
either "slightly conservative," "conservative," or "extremely
conservative" than those who identified as "slightly liberal,"
"liberal," or "extremely liberal." By 1994, that difference grew to
twenty-one percent. The data show that the electorate was
growing increasingly more conservative both in the South and
nationally. By 1994, the typical American voter was considerably
more conservative than liberal. However, this advantage in self-
identification did not yield electoral wins for conservative
congressional candidates.
227 Id. at 31.
228 Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification 1972-2008, AM. NAT'L ELECTION
STUDIES (Aug. 5, 2010), http:/www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab3 1.
htm. This is the leading academic national survey of voters in the United States. It
is based at the University of Michigan and is run in partnership with Stanford
University. The data presented in this Article were compiled from The American
National Election Studies Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, AM.
NAT'L ELECTION STUDIES, http-//www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/gd-index.htm
(last visited June 1, 2013). The conservative lead in the polls is calculated by
subtracting the sum of those who identify as either "slightly liberal," "liberal," or
"extremely liberal" from the sum of those who identify as either "slightly
conservative," "conservative," or "extremely conservative." These data are fully set
forth in Appendix A.
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FIGURE 2229
CONSERVATIVE ADVANTAGE IN SELF-IDENTIFICATION POLLING,
1972-1998
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2. The Failure of Realignment To Translate into Congressional
Wins for the GOP
While there was a national and regional ideological shift
among voters, there was no major shift electorally until 1994.
Figure 3 reveals that the growth of conservatism yielded success
for Republican presidential candidates, yet failed to translate to
GOP support in congressional races. In 1972, Republican
presidential nominee Richard M. Nixon received seventy percent
of the popular vote in the South while Republican candidates for
Congress received almost half that total. At the same time, the
number of southerners who identified themselves as conservative
was twelve percent greater than the amount that self-identified
as liberal. Despite this significant advantage in ideological
229 See Liberal-Conservative Self-Identification 1972-2008, supra note 228; see
also infra app. A.
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identification and presidential support, a mere thirty percent of
Southern voters cast votes for Republican congressional
candidates in 1972.
FIGURE 3230
OVERALL VOTE PERCENTAGE WITHIN THE SOUTH,
REPUBLICAN HOUSE AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES,
1940-1998
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Even during the Reagan landslide election of 1984, voters
remained loyal to Democratic incumbents in congressional races.
In 1984, a remarkable 62.4% of southerners voted for Ronald
Reagan, yet only 42.2% cast their ballots for a Republican
member of Congress. Undoubtedly, members of the Conservative
Opportunity Society were puzzled. Southerners-and even
Americans generally-were identifying themselves as
conservative and then acting upon those conservative views by
casting ballots for a conservative Republican president. And yet,
they continued to reelect liberal incumbent members to
Congress. Due to presidential term limits, candidates for the
230 The data reported were compiled from RUSK, supra note 60 and are fully set
forth in Appendix B.
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executive branch do not possess the same incumbent advantages
as members of Congress. We therefore see conservative voters
electing conservative presidents. As one scholar has pointed out,
"All of the arguments for term limits are premised on the costs of
incumbency advantage."2 3 1
There was clearly an emerging shift in the underlying
political preferences of voters232 that failed to yield success for
conservatives seeking congressional seats.23 3 The Republican
members felt underrepresented within Congress as conservatives
continued to reelect liberal Democrats. As early as 1972, the
GOP held the ideological advantage among voters, yet
constituents continued to elect Democratic incumbents.
That said, simply tallying the number of votes cast for
Republican candidates is an imperfect measure of whether
conservative interests had been underrepresented in Congress.
Fortunately, there is a more sophisticated measure of member
ideology in the form of the "DW-NOMINATE" scores created by
Professors Poole and Rosenthal.2 3 4 Political scientists employ
these data as a measure of lawmaker ideology. The DW-
NOMINATE scores assess the ideological position of each
legislator based upon roll call voting records. Scores typically
range from the most conservative at +1 to the most liberal at -1.
A score at or around zero is considered moderate.
Figure 4 displays the DW-NOMINATE scores from 1930-
2010 for the members of the House of Representatives. It
presents the average scores for each party and for the chamber
as a whole.23 5 Figure 5 charts the same calculations for the
231 Alexander Tabarrok, A Survey, Critique, and New Defense of Term Limits, 14
CATO J. 333, 333 (1994), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/
files/cato-journal/1994/1 1/cj 14n2-9.pdf.
232 See supra fig.2.
233 See supra fig.3.
2" See Royce Carroll et al., DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard
Errors, VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp (last updated Feb. 3,
2011). DW-NOMINATE scores measure the ideology of members of congress along a
liberal-conservative spectrum based upon their roll call votes. Id.
235 These two sets of scores are available for download from Nolan McCarty,
Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Political Party Means 46th to 111th Houses,
VOTEVIEW.COM, ftp://voteview.com/junkord/hmeans3_46_111.txt (last visited June 1,
2013)
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Senate.236 These graphs show that between 1930 and 1980, the
House and Senate each grew more liberal. During that time
period, the Republican Party experienced limited ideological
variance, whereas the Democratic Party veered noticeably to the
left. This trend reversed in the 1980s as voters elected more
conservative members. This movement coincides with the voting
records of the Conservative Opportunity Society. Both the House
and Senate remained more liberal until the Republican landslide
elections of 1995. As expected, Congress as a whole shifted
rightward following the 1994 elections.
FIGURE 4. U.S. HOUSE 1930-2010:
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236 Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Political Party Means
46th to 111th Senates, VOTEVIEW.COM, ftp://voteview.com/junkord/smeans3_46_111.
txt (last visited June 1, 2013).
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FIGURE 5. U.S. SENATE 1930-2010:
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These findings support the strategic model's underlying
logic. Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that between 1970 and
1998, voters were more conservative than liberal. And yet, voters
continued to elect liberal Democrats to Congress.23 7 The
Democrats elected by the conservative electorate were casting
liberal roll call votes.2 38 The strategic model posits that
conservative politicians believed that voters faced a dilemma.
Constituents wanted to cast their ballots for candidates who
embodied their own conservative ideological views. However,
these challengers were running against sitting incumbents.
Ousting an incumbent meant losing out on all of the legislative
benefits senior incumbents are equipped to deliver to their
constituents. 23 9 The cost of losing out on seniority outweighed
the benefit of electing an individual who was closer in ideology.
237 See supra fig.3.
238 See supra figs.4 & 5.
239 See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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Each district therefore reelected its senior member.
Conservatives believed that term limits offered one way to solve
this dilemma.
3. The Fading of GOP Support for Term Limits After
Republicans Won the House
Following the 1994 election, House Majority Leader Dick
Armey said, "If the Republicans can straighten out the House, I
think Americans will find their enthusiasm for term limits
waning quite a bit."2 4 0 This part of the Article focuses on whether
politician support was strategic or sincere. An individual who
sincerely believes in the mission of term limits would likely not
seek reelection after serving a predetermined number of terms.
The data tell a different story.2 4 '
Roll call votes provide one quantitative means of identifying
which members publicly supported term limits. Of the 227
Representatives who voted in support of H.J. Res. 73 in 1995,
which would have limited tenure in each chamber to twelve
years, 144 (63.4%) went on to serve more than twelve years.242
Seventy served twenty years or more, twelve served thirty years
or more, and two served forty years or more.2 43 Of the eighty-
three Representatives who served fewer than twelve years, only
five did so to honor a self-imposed term limits pledge.244 The
others either ran for a different political office, lost a bid for
reelection, died while in office, resigned, or decided not to run for
reelection for other reasons.24 5 A significant majority of those
who served fewer than twelve years did not voluntarily step
down; rather, they were defeated in bids for reelection.24 6
The results were similar in the Senate. Senator Bill Frist
was the only Senator who voted in support of term limits and
likewise honored a self-imposed pledge to serve two terms.24 7
Forty-eight of the term limits supporters in the Senate completed
240 141 CONG. REC. 9116 (1995) (statement of Rep. Gutierrez) (quoting Jim
Abrams, Some Republicans Are Having Second Thoughts About Term Limits,
AsSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 1994 (quoting Rep. Dick Armey)).
241 See infra apps. D-H.
242 See infra app. F.
24 See infra app. F.
244 See infra app. D.
245 See infra app. E.
240 See infra app. E.
247 See infra app. G.
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more than twelve years. In fact, thirty-eight served twenty years
or more, eighteen served thirty years or more, three served forty
years or more, and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina
served fifty years even though he voted in favor of term limits.24 8
Congressman Bill McCollum, who sponsored the House term
limits amendment, said, "What the American people have seen,
that many in Congress have not admitted to in recent years, is
the fact that we really have become very career-
oriented ... [term limits would] mitigate the career orientation of
too many Members of Congress .... McCollum served twenty
years in the House. 2 50 He later ran unsuccessfully as a candidate
for the United States Senate in 2000 and 2004. 251 In 2006, he
was elected Attorney General for the State of Florida and was a
candidate in the 2010 Florida gubernatorial election.25 2
Most of the freshman members who pledged they would only
serve three terms have since reneged their own self-imposed
limits. 2 53 Republican George Nethercutt broke his pledge to serve
only three terms.25 4 Three representatives who stepped aside to
abide by their pledge later successfully ran for the Senate: Tom
Coburn of Oklahoma, Jim DeMint of South Carolina, and John
Thune of South Dakota.25 5 Moreover, some members expressly
renounced their self-imposed pledges, including Representatives
Martin T. Meehan, Scott McInnis, and George Nethercutt.2 5 6
It appears that the GOP-now the majority party-had
adopted their Leader Dick Armey's view that enthusiasm for
term limits would wane. The GOP was no longer concerned with
248 See infra app. H.
249 141 CONG. REC. 7088 (1995) (statement of Rep. McCollum).
250 See infra app. F.
251 See McCollum, Ira William, Jr. (Bill), (1994-), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY
U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000350
(last visited June 1, 2013).
252 Michael C. Bender, Rick Scott Turns To Top Lobbyist to Help Finance
Inauguration, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/
the-buzz-florida-politics/content/rick-scott-turns-top-lobbyist-help-finance-
inauguration; Dan Dewitt, He Was Born to Be Serious, HERNANDO TIMES, Nov. 19,
2006, at 1.
253 See Zeller, supra note 15.
254 Andrea Stone, Term-Limit Pledges Get Left Behind, USA TODAY, Apr. 13,
2006, at 5A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-12-
term-limits x.htm.
255 Id.
256 See Kristin Brainerd, Several Term Limit Supporters Recant Vows To Leave
House, Saying Their Work Is Not Yet Done, CQ WKLY., June 19, 1999.
804 [Vol. 86:761
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS
the electoral advantages of incumbency. As New York
Representative Michael Forbes put it, "Candidly, [the
Republican] leadership didn't want them any more than the old
leadership did."25 7 It is perhaps possible to conclude that support
for term limits in the early 1990s was strategic and not sincere.
Congressional voting records show that the Republican
Revolution yielded a conservative congress. 58 Thus, conservative
lawmakers were no longer as interested in ousting sitting
incumbents.
B. Support for Term Limits Energized by Anti-Incumbent Mood
Anti-incumbent zeal feeds support for term limits.2 59 When
the electorate is dissatisfied with the direction in which the
country is heading, its instinct is to show anger toward the
government. In the early 1990s, politicians tapped into this rage
on the campaign trail by promising to fix Congress with term
limits.
Figure 6 graphs data compiled from a Gallup Poll conducted
over the past eighteen years.26 0 When asked, "Do most members
of Congress deserve reelection?", the fewest number of Americans
said "Yes" in 1992 and in 2010. Figure 6 demonstrates that
general public approval was at record lows in 1992 and 1994 with
more than half of the population stating that members do not
deserve reelection. That number eventually fell to 36.5% in 1996,
28% in 1998, 30.5% in 2000, and 26.5% in 2002. As expected,
during those times of higher approval ratings, there was not a
large public outcry for term limits.
In the early 1990s, voter hostility pressured members of
Congress to support legislation designed to reign in the perceived
corruption of the federal government.2 6 1  "It's a sign of the
continuing distrust of government," said Don Linky, president of
257 Doug Bandow, The Political Revolution That Wasn't: Why Term Limits Are
Needed Now More Than Ever, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS INST. (Sept. 5, 1996),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-259.html.
258 See supra figs.4 & 5.
259 See, e.g., HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 28, at 74-82.
260 Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Voters Favor Congressional Newcomers Over
Incumbents, GALLUP (June 8, 2010), http//www.gallup.com/poll/139409/Voters-
Favor-Congressional-Newcomers-Incumbents.aspx.
261 See Janet Hook, Voters' Hostility Is Shaping the Business of Congress, 52
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 785, 785-89 (1994).
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the Public Affairs Research Institute of New Jersey in 1994.22
"Anybody in office now should be worried about the mood of the
country... " That said, we might expect to see significant
support for term limits in 2010, given the record high sixty-three
percent of Americans who believe most members of Congress do
not deserve reelection.26 This is the subject of Part IV.
FIGURE 6265
GALLUP POLL: DO MOST MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DESERVE
REELECTION?
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C. Limitations of the Captured Data
This section has called into question the sincerity with which
lawmakers cast roll call votes in favor of term limits. Yet, it is
possible for legislators to have supported term limits for sincere
reasons while simultaneously serving thirty to forty years in
262 Karen Foerstel, Term Limits Are Top Initiative for Disgruntled Electorate, 52
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3139, 3139 (1994).
263 Id.
264 Jones, supra note 260.
21 See id.
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Congress. For example, a lawmaker might sincerely support
term limits, but not as much as he or she supports a balanced
budget amendment, legislation to lower taxes, campaign finance
reform, or a host of other issues. If that lawmaker decides not to
seek reelection out of a sincere belief that office rotation is
valuable, that lawmaker is forfeiting his or her power to legislate
on all other issues. These competing considerations are not
entirely addressed by the data presented in this Article.
Still, these limitations do not detract from the strategic
model's usefulness. As previously stated, public choice theorists
predict legislative outcomes based upon fundamental
assumptions made about lawmakers, voters, and how both
behave collectively.26 6 We assume legislators and their
constituents are rational, self-interested actors who respond
predictably when faced with a set of constraints and choices.26 7
In short, similarly situated actors will make similar decisions
when faced with similar circumstances. While roll-call votes
alone are not a perfect measure of member support, they do serve
as a powerful measure of how members will behave with regard
to a term limits bill when faced with a certain set of
circumstances. Part IV takes this analysis further by using the
lessons learned from the data presented thus far to predict what
might impact the term limits movement led by the Tea Party.
IV. THE TEA PARTY AND TERM LIMITS
There are striking similarities between the term limits
movement led by the Republican Revolutionaries of 1994 and the
one sparked by the Tea Party Patriots approximately fifteen
years later. Both are grassroots campaigns fueled by anti-
incumbent, anti-establishment ideals. 2 68  Both stem from the
conservative base of the GOP, gaining momentum in the months
leading up to the midterm elections. Both have evolved at times
when Republicans were the minority party in Congress. And
266 Supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text.
26 Supra notes 144-63 and accompanying text.
268 For an historical review of the Tea Party movement, see generally Peter
Katel, Tea Party Movement: Will Angry Conservatives Reshape the Republican
Party?, CQ RESEARCHER, Mar. 19, 2010, available at http://library.cqpress.com/
cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre20lOO3l900&type=hitlist&num=5; Joseph J.
Schatz, Reading the Tea Leaves at the Capitol, 68 CQ WKLY. 480, 482 (2010); and
Dana Milbank, Putting the "Tea" in GOP?, Wash. Post, July 22, 2010, at A02.
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both grew out of contempt for a more liberal-sitting president.2
Thus, applying the strategic model developed previously should
shed light on how legislators might behave in the 112th Congress
with regard to term reform.
A. The Tea Party Patriots
The Tea Party movement is named for the 1773 protest
against British taxation.270  It is a grass-roots political
organization, with more than 1,000 community-based clusters,
each touting strong conservative views. 27 1 The inaugural Tea
Party gathering occurred on Tax Day in 2009 when 1.2 million
people gathered at protests around the country, decrying what
they believed to be wasteful government spending.27 2 Protestors
voiced their anger over the federal bailouts of banks, financial
institutions, and automobile corporations.2 73 In the months
following Tax Day, Tea Party groups began to formally organize
around a national conservative platform.2 74 Originally, Tea Party
activity commenced in states with historically conservative
voting blocks, 275 but as the movement grew more mainstream,
there emerged Tea Party groups in every state of the country.27
The most mainstream of these groups is the Tea Party
Patriots.27 7 With chapters in every state, the Tea Party Patriots'
stated mission "is to restore America's founding principles of
Fiscal Responsibility, Constitutionally Limited Government and
Free Markets."2 78
The movement took on a dual persona as the 2010 midterm
elections approached. While it remained a grass-roots movement
organizing voters at the local level, it also developed into an
organized national force, providing significant funding to
269 Katel, supra note 268, at 243 ("[T]he Tea Party movement is on the cutting
edge of a conservative surge that aims to undercut, or even defeat, the Obama
administration and what foes call its big-government, socialist agenda.").
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 243-44.
273 Id. at 244.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 246.
276 State Directory, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/local
(last visited June 1, 2013).
277 Katel, supra note 268, at 245.
278 About Tea Party Patriots, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, https://www.teaparty
patriots.orglaboutt (last visited June 1, 2013).
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conservative congressional candidates.2 79  Congressional
Quarterly journalist Steve Peoples noted that the localized grass-
roots organizations "opened an enthusiasm gap between parties
in virtually every state in the nation, even in places where
Democrats hold a widespread registration advantage, such as
Pennsylvania and Illinois."28 0 At the same time, more centralized
national organizations like the Tea Party Patriots "operated
much like a political party, funneling financial resources, paid
media and get-out-the-vote operations to like-minded
candidates .. .. The formalized tea party groups had formal
spokesmen and media-savvy leaders who ultimately became the
faces of an anti-establishment movement."281
There are those who questioned whether the Tea Party
represented a fringe group of conservatives and would eventually
fade from the public limelight.28 2 Yet, as the movement grew,
Republican Party leaders sought to absorb its conservative
message and channel its activist force. 283 The leaders of the Tea
Party likewise realized that promoting their agenda within the
GOP was essential in order to avoid becoming marginalized by
America's two party voting structure.2 " This symbiotic
relationship between the Republican establishment and the Tea
Party has effectively moved the GOP rightward on the ideological
spectrum of issues.285
Much like the conservative-driven "Contract with America,"
the strength and popularity of the Tea Party helped to shape the
outcome of key congressional races. For example, the Tea Party
contributed to primary victories for conservative U.S. Senate
279 See Steve Peoples, For Democrats, A Blue Lining to a Stormy Week, 68 CQ
WKLY. 2570, 2570 (2010).
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 See Katel, supra note 268, at 249 ("The surfacing of the tensions among the
tea partiers did lend substance to press reports of fringe constituencies attaching
themselves to the movement, whose primary concerns publicly center on economic
policy.").
283 See Bob Benenson, A Tea Party Lift For the Other Guys?, 68 CQ WKLY. 2136,
2136 (2010) ("When the tea party movement began blossoming last year ... the
Republican Party's leaders hoped to harness the activist energy to mainstream
conservative candidates with solid prospects for winning 2010 victories that would
put the GOP back in charge at the Capitol.").
284 See Katel, supra note 268, at 247.
281 Id. ("Tea partiers are also trying to push the national Republican Party to
the right, with Tea Party-affiliated candidates this year running in GOP primaries
for at least 58 congressional and state offices, including three governorships.").
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candidates Ken Buck of Colorado; Rand Paul of Kentucky;
Sharron Angle of Nevada; incumbent Republican Jim DeMint of
South Carolina; 86  Marco Rubio of Florida, who beat
establishment candidate Governor Charlie Crist for the GOP
nomination; activist Christine O'Donnell, who beat the GOP-
backed favorite Representative Michael N. Castle;28 7 Joe Miller,
who defeated sitting Senator Lisa Murkowski in Alaska's GOP
primary;2 88 and U.S. Senator Scott Brown of the traditionally
liberal Massachusetts. 2 8 9  This political momentum gradually
spread from campaign trails to the halls of Congress. For
instance, in late July 2010, a collection of conservative
Representatives announced the establishment of the Tea Party
Caucus, with forty-two House Republican members.o
B. The Tea Party Push for Term Limits
On the opposite side of the political aisle, Democrats were
hamstrung by the unpopularity of the corporate bailouts and the
health care legislation.2 91 The result was a toxic, anti-incumbent
political climate.292 In a Gallup Poll asking registered voters if
2" See Peoples, supra note 279.
287 See id.; Gerald F. Seib, Republicans' Senate Hopes Ride with the Tea Party,
WALL ST. J. CAPITAL J. BLOG (July 12, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/
capitaljournal/2010/07/12/republicans-senate-hopes-ride-with-the-tea-party.
2" Liz Sidoti, Is the Republican Party in Line for a Tea Party Takeover?,
PORTLAND PRESs HERALD (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.pressherald.com/news/
nationworld/party-within-a-party-is-the-gop-becoming-tea_2010-09-02.html ("The
grass-roots network of fed-up conservative-libertarian voters displayed its power in
its biggest triumph of the election year: the toppling of Sen. Lisa Murkowski in
Alaska's GOP primary. Political novice Joe Miller is the fifth tea party insurgent to
win a GOP Senate nominating contest, an upset that few, if any, saw coming.").
288 See Katel, supra note 268, at 243 ("The [Tea Party] movement proved itself a
political force to be reckoned with in the special Senate election in January of
Republican Scott Brown for the Massachusetts Senate seat held by the late liberal
Democratic lion, Edward M. Kennedy.").
290 For a complete list of all members of the Tea Party Caucus, see The Tea
Party's at Their House, 68 CQ WKLY. 1785, 1785 (2010).
281 Katel, supra note 268, at 243; Scott Montgomery, Party Crashers: Primary
Season Hints at Anti-Incumbent Mood, 68 CQ WKLY. 1178, 1178 (2010) ("Heading
into the thick of the primary season, the question arises: Is this an anti-Democrat
year, as everyone first thought, or is it more broadly an anti-incumbent year that
threatens established politicians in both parties?").
292 See Montgomery, supra note 291; see also John McArdle, Primary Trouble for
the Establishment, 68 CQ WKLY. 1286, 1286 (2010) ("Two Democratic senators
[Senators Arlen Specter and Blanche Lincoln]-one ousted after three decades and
one hanging on the ropes-last week became the latest victims of this year's anti-
incumbent mood, while on the Republican side, a candidate backed by tea party
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"'most members of Congress' deserve reelection," sixty-three
percent responded, "No."293 This is the highest rate in more than
eighteen years. 294
The Tea Party claimed to have a way to deal with this
perceived need to remove incumbents from office: term limits.
U.S. Senator Rand Paul, a leading member of the Tea Party,"9
noted, "Over 80% of the public, both Democrats and Republicans,
favor term limits. What will it take to force a vote on
Congressional Term Limits? . .. What the movement needs is a
leader elected to the US Senate. I hope you will help both the
Term Limits movement and the country by supporting my
campaign for the US Senate."2 96  Likewise, self-proclaimed Tea
Partier Senator Jim DeMint29 argued, "As long as members have
the chance to spend their lives in Washington, their interests will
always skew toward spending taxpayer dollars to buy off special
interests, covering over corruption in the bureaucracy,
fundraising, relationship building among lobbyists, and trading
favors for pork-in short, amassing their own power."9
According to U.S. Term Limits, Inc., a total of fifty-six candidates
for Congress took a term limits pledge in 20 10.211
While some thought this anti-incumbent movement would
not last,0 o the campaign culminated with a GOP gain of more
than sixty congressional districts. 01 This exceeded even the fifty-
three seat GOP pickup in 1994. Republicans had reclaimed their
majority status in the House, which they had lost just four years
earlier in 2006.302
activists [Rand Paul] bucked the party establishment to win the nomination for an
open Senate seat.").
292 See Jones, supra note 260.
294 Id.
295 See McArdle, supra note 292.
296 Rand Paul for Term Limits!, RAND PAUL: U.S. SENATE (Nov. 1, 2009),
http://www.randpaul20O10.com/2009/11/rand-paul-for-term-limits.
297 See Schatz, supra note 268, at 485.
298 See S.A. Miller, DeMint Tries to Ban "Permanent Politicians", WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2009, at A8, available at http://www.washingtontimes.comnews/2009/nov/
11/demint-revives-bill-to-ban-permanent-politicians/.
29 See U.S. TERM LIMITS, INC., Term Limits Pledge, TERMLIMITS.ORG,
http://www.termlimits.org/content.asp?pl=112&contentid=112 (last visited Jan. 28,
2012).
11 See Katel, supra note 268, at 249.
302 See Alan K. Ota, New Majority, New Challenges, 68 CQ WKLY. 2528, 2531
(2010).
302 See id. at 2528.
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The Tea Party has remained a powerhouse within the
GOP.' Tea Party political clout stems from the movement's
popularity among voters.30 4 A Gallup Poll taken in mid-January
of 2011 found that seventy percent of Americans, including
eighty-eight percent of Republicans, thought it important that
GOP leaders in Congress "take the tea party movement's
positions and objectives into account as they address the nation's
problems. Moreover, by some accounts, the Tea Party Caucus
in the House has grown to include at least fifty members.0 In
fact, there is some indication that the visceral reaction toward
incumbents in 2010 was even greater than in 1994.307 For
example, a Pew Research Center poll found the following:
Hostility toward government seems likely to be a significant
election issue and an important element in both midterm voting
intentions and turnout. While there was widespread distrust of
the federal government in the late 1990s, just 37% went so far
as to say that the federal government needed "very major
reform." Today [20101, that figure stands at 53%; increasing
numbers of Republicans, independents and Democrats say that
government needs very major reform. Still, far more
Republicans (65%) and independents (54%) than Democrats
(41%) express this view.308
C. Predictions for the Future
As observed in Parts I-III of this Article, viewing the
lawmaking process through the lens of public choice theory
suggests that dissatisfaction with Congress provides fodder for
congressional candidates to endorse mandatory office rotation.
This Article proposes that politicians will support term limits
when both of two conditions are met: (1) they are members of an
ideologically underrepresented political faction and (2) they see a
political opportunity to make the most of anti-incumbent opinion
303 See Sam Goldfarb, Tea Partiers Build Capitol Credibility, 69 CQ WKLY. 378
(2011).
3 See id.
305 Id.
3 Id.
307 See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, THE PEOPLE AND
THEIR GOVERNMENT: DISTRUST, DISCONTENT, ANGER, AND PARTISAN RANCOR 9
(2010), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/606.pdf.
3 Id.
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by wrapping it into a popular platform among their voters.
Using this model allows us to better predict the fate of term
limits in the 112' Congress.
While the second condition-anti-incumbent sentiment-is
currently met, the first is not. Recall that prior to the election of
a Republican majority in 1994, more voters had identified
themselves as conservative than liberal going back as far as
1972. And yet, throughout that entire span of time, the
conservative GOP remained an underrepresented minority. The
Republicans believed that they had been underrepresented in
Congress. Contrast that to the current Republican Party, which,
until 2006, controlled a majority of both the House and the
Senate. This is not the sort of historical underrepresentation
that the GOP experienced from the Great Depression through the
1994 election.
Asking lawmakers to impose term limits on themselves is a
tall order. Representative Bob Inglis of South Carolina compared
asking Congress to vote for term limits to "asking the chicken to
vote for Colonel Sanders.""0 Politician support for term limits
requires extraordinary circumstances. The Republican
Revolution was an historical anomaly. Not only was public
distrust for government at historically high levels, the election of
a GOP majority represented a paradigm shift in voting. For only
the second time since the Great Depression, Republicans won a
majority of the seats in the House. And yet, even under those
circumstances, conservatives could not muster up the votes to
pass term limits reform. This model therefore predicts that,
absent the first condition, term limits stand even less of a chance
of becoming public law in the future than they did in 1994.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the debate surrounding term
limits and has then analyzed lawmaker support for term limits
using public choice theory. It has developed a new strategic
model to predict when lawmakers will back term limits. The
thesis of this Article is that politicians will support congressional
term limits when both of two conditions are met: (1) they are
members of an ideologically underrepresented political faction
3' Holly Idelson, Ruling Pressures Congress To Address Term Limits, 53 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1479, 1479 (1995).
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and (2) they see a political opportunity to package anti-
incumbent sentiment into a popular platform among voters. This
Article does not dispose of the debate on the desirability of term
limits as sound public policy. But both the public choice analysis
and the empirical data demonstrate that if scholars and voters
are to rely on the arguments legislators submit in favor of term
limits, their analysis will benefit from applying the strategic
model developed in this Article. Any realistic evaluation of term
limits thus ought to address the seemingly insincere-yet
strategic-positions taken by lawmakers.
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APPENDIX A
NATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION3 10
Percentage Percentage
who identified who identified
as extremely as extremely Percentage
Year conservative, liberal, liberal, Conservative
conservative, or slightly Advantage
or slightly liberal
conservative
1972 26 18 8
1974 26 21 5
1976 25 16 9
1978 27 20 7
1980 28 17 11
1982 27 15 12
1984 29 18 11
1986 30 18 12
1988 32 17 15
1990 26 16 10
1992 31 20 11
1994 36 14 22
1996 33 18 15
1998 30 18 12
2000 30 20 10
2002 35 23 12
2004 31 19 12
2008 32 22 10
310 These data were compiled from The American National Election Study Guide
to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, supra note 228.
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SOUTHERN SELF-IDENTIFICATION3 11
Percentage Percentage
who identified who identified
as extremely Percentage
as extremelyYEAR conservative, liberal, liberal, Cservative
conservative, or slightly Advantage
or slightly liberal
conservative
1972 27 15 12
1974 25 14 11
1976 26 12 14
1978 28 15 13
1980 28 13 15
1982 27 11 16
1984 27 14 13
1986 26 14 12
1988 28 12 16
1990 22 11 11
1992 28 16 12
1994 33 12 21
1996 31 14 17
1998 30 16 14
2000 31 17 14
2002 37 18 19
2004 33 14 19
2008 38 16 22
311 See id.
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APPENDIX B
OVERALL VOTE PERCENTAGE WITHIN THE SOUTH,
REPUBLICAN HOUSE AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES,
1940 - 1998312
Percentage of Percentage of
southerners who southerners who
Y m voted for a voted for aRepublican Republican
candidate in the candidate in the
House election presidential election
1940 11.7 21.6
1942 11.6 -
1944 14.6 25.2
1946 18.7 -
1948 15.1 26.5
1950 13.6 -
1952 14.1 48.1
1954 17.7 -
1956 20.7 48.9
1958 17.6 -
1960 22 46
1962 34.5 -
1964 32.8 48.7
1966 33 -
1968 34.8 34.6
1970 30.9 -
1972 37 69.6
1974 34.2 -
1976 35.6 44.7
1978 40.2 -
1980 43 51.4
1982 38.6 -
1984 42.2 62.4
1986 40
312 These data were compiled from RUSK, supra note 60.
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1988 41.2 58.3
1990 41 -
1992 45.3 42.6
1994 55.1 -
1996 53.4 46.1
1998 53.7 -
818
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APPENDIX C
GALLUP POLL: "Do MOST MEMBERS OF CONGRESS DESERVE
RE-ELECTION? (1992-2010)313
Year Yes No
1992 30.25 50.5
1994 41 44.83
1996 48.5 36.5
1998 56.5 28
2000 55 30.5
2002 57 26.5
2004 51 51
2006 39.2 50.6
2008 37 51
2010 30 64
313 These data were compiled from Jones, supra note 260.
2012] 819
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX D314
THE FIVE REPRESENTATIVES WHO VOTED IN SUPPORT OF H.J.
RES. 73 AND HONORED THEIR TERM TIMITS PLEDGE3 15
Senate Service House ServiceMember Party / State (eas(er)(Years) (Years)
Rep. Canady R-FL -- 8
Rep. Chenoweth R-ID 6
Rep. Fowler R-FL -- 8
Rep. Metcalf R-WA 6
Rep. Miller R-FL -- 10
3 The data in Appendices D, E, and F were compiled by the author using roll
call votes in favor of House Joint Resolution 73, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, H.R, FINAL
VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 277 (1995), available at http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/1995/roll277.xml, and an online database of Congressional biographies,
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/
biosearch.asp (last visited June 1, 2013).
31s See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF U.S. CONG., supra note 314; OFFICE OF THE
CLERK, H.R, supra note 314; cf Foerstel, supra note 262 (discussing the rise of the
term limits movement through state ballot initiatives); Lisa Licari, Promises to Keep
in 2002, 59 CQ WKLY. 161, 161 (2001) (describing other members of Congress who
stood by their term limit pledges later in 2002).
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APPENDiX E
THE SEVENTY-EIGHT REPRESENTATIVES WHO VOTED IN SUPPORT
OF H.J. RES. 73 AND SERVED No MORE THAN TWELVE YEARS FOR
REASONS OTHER THAN HONORING A TERM LIMITS PLEDGE
Member Party Senate House Reason for Serving No More
& Service Service Than 12 Years
State (Years) (Years)
Rep. Baker
Rep. Baldacci
Rep. Barcia
Rep. Barr
Rep. Barrett
Rep. Blute
Rep. Bono
Rep. Brewster
Rep. Browder
Rep. Bryant
Rep. Bunn
Rep. Chrysler
Rep. Collins
Rep. Cooley
Rep. Cremeans
Rep. Danner
Rep. Deutsch
Rep. Dickey
Rep. Dunn
Rep. Ewing
Rep. Flanagan
Rep. Foley
Rep. Forbes
Rep. Fox
R-CA
D-ME
D-MI
R-GA
R-NE
R-MA
R-CA
D-OK
D-AL
R-TN
R-OR
R-MI
R-GA
R-OR
R-OH
D-MO
D-FL
R-AR
R-WA
R-IL
R-IL
R-FL
R-NY
R-PA
L _______ .1. _________ ± _________ .1~
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Elected Governor of Maine
Elected to state senate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Died in office
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Resigned
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
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Rep. Franks
Rep. Franks
Rep. Frisa
Rep.
Funderburk
Rep. Furse
Rep. Ganske
Rep. Greenwood
Rep. Gutknecht
Rep. Hancock
Rep. Hayes
Rep. Hayworth
Rep. Heineman
Rep. Hilleary
Rep. Hoke
Rep. Horn
Rep.
Hutchinson
Rep. Inglis
Rep. Kelly
Rep. Kim
Rep. Klug
Rep. Largent
Rep. Lazio
Rep. Lightfoot
Rep. Luther
Rep. Martini
Rep. Mascara
Rep. McCarthy
Rep. McInnis
Rep. McIntosh
R-CT
R-NJ
R-NY
R-NC
D-OR
R-IA
R-PA
R-MN
R-MO
D-LA
R-AZ
R-NC
R-TN
R-OH
R-CA
R-AR
R-SC
R-NY
R-CA
R-WI
R-OK
R-NY
R-IA
D-MN
R-NJ
D-PA
D-MO
R-CO
R-IN
6
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful gubernatorial
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful gubernatorial
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful gubernatorial
candidate
Unsuccessful gubernatorial
candidate
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Rep. Meyers
Rep. Minge
Rep. Nethercutt
Rep. Neumann
Rep. Ney
Rep. Norwood
Rep. Orton
Rep. Paxon
Rep. Peterson
Rep. Poshard
Rep. Quinn
Rep. Riggs
Rep. Sanford
Rep.
Scarborough
Rep. Schiff
Rep. Seastrand
Rep. Smith
Rep. Smith
Rep. Tate
Rep. Thornton
Rep. Torkildsen
Rep. Waldholtz
Rep. Watts
Rep. White
Rep. Zeliff
R-KS
D-MN
R-WA
R-WI
R-OH
R-GA
D-UT
R-NY
D-FL
D-IL
R-NY
R-CA
R-SC
R-FL
R-NM
R-CA
R-MI
R-WA
R-WA
D-AR
R-MA
R-UT
R-OK
R-WA
R-NH
Rep. Zimmer H-NJ 6
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Resigned
Died in office
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful gubernatorial
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Not a candidate for reelection
Elected Governor of South
Carolina
Resigned
Died in office
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Elected to the state supreme court
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Not a candidate for reelection
Not a candidate for reelection
Unsuccessful U.S. House
candidate
Unsuccessful gubernatorial
candidate
Unsuccessful U.S. Senate
candidate
2012] 823
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APPENDIX F
THE 144 REPRESENTATIVES WHO VOTED IN SUPPORT OF H.J. RES.
73 AND SERVED MORE THAN TWELVE YEARS IN CONGRESS, AND
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF YEARS THEY SERVED IN EACH CHAMBER
Senate House
Member Party / State Service Service
(Years) (Years)
Rep. Armey R-TX -- 18
Rep. Bachus R-AL -- 20
Rep. Ballenger R-NC -- 19
Rep. Bartlett R-MD 20
Rep. Bass R-NH -- 14
Rep. Bereuter R-NE -- 26
Rep. Bevill D-AL -- 30
Rep. Bilbray R-CA -- 13
Rep. Bilirakis R-FL -- 24
Rep. Boehner R-OH -- 22
Rep. Bonilla R-TX -- 14
Rep. Brown D-OH 6 14
Rep. Brownback R-KS 15 2
Rep. Bunning R-KY 12 12
Rep. Burr R-NC 8 10
Rep. Burton R-IN -- 30
Rep. Buyer R-IN -- 18
Rep. Callahan R-AL -- 20
Rep. Calvert R-CA -- 20
Rep. Camp R-MI -- 22
Rep. Castle R-DE -- 18
Rep. Chabot R-OH -- 16
Rep. Chambliss R-GA 10 8
Rep. Clement D-TN -- 16
Rep. Clinger R-PA -- 18
Rep. Clyburn D-SC -- 20
Rep. Coble R-NC -- 28
Rep. Coburn R-OK 8 6
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Rep. Combest R-TX -- 19
Rep. Condit D-CA -- 14
Rep. Cox R-CA -- 17
Rep. Cramer D-AL -- 18
Rep. Crane R-IL -- 36
Rep. Crapo R-ID 14 6
Rep. Cubin R-WY -- 14
Rep. Cunningham R-CA -- 14
Rep. Davis R-VA -- 13
Rep. Deal D-GA -- 18
Rep. Diaz-Balart R-FL -- 18
Rep. Doolittle R-CA -- 18
Rep. Dornan R-CA -- 18
Rep. Doyle D-PA -- 18
Rep. Duncan R-TN -- 25
Rep. Ehlers R-MI -- 18
Rep. Emerson R-MO -- 17
Rep. English R-PA -- 14
Rep. Ensign R-NV 10 4
Rep. Eshoo D-CA -- 20
Rep. Everett R-AL -- 16
Rep. Fields R-TX -- 16
Rep. Frelinghuysen R-NJ -- 18
Rep. Gallegly R-CA -- 26
Rep. Gekas R-PA -- 20
Rep. Gilchrest R-MD -- 18
Rep. Gillmor R-OH -- 20
Rep. Gingrich R-GA -- 20
Rep. Goodlatte R-VA -- 20
Rep. Goodling R-PA -- 26
Rep. Gordon D-TN -- 26
Rep. Goss R-FL -- 16
Rep. Graham R-SC 10 8
Rep. Gunderson R-WI -- 16
Rep. Hall D-TX -- 32
Rep. Hansen R-UT -- 22
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Rep. Harman D-CA 
-- 18
Rep. Hastert R-IL 
-- 22
Rep. Hastings R-WA 
-- 18
Rep. Herger R-CA 
-- 26
Rep. Hobson R-OH 
-- 18
Rep. Hoekstra R-MI 
-- 18
Rep. Holden D-PA 
-- 20
Rep. Houghton R-NY 
-- 18
Rep. Istook R-OK 
-- 14
Rep. Jacobs D-IN -- 30
Rep. Johnson D-SD 16 10
Rep. Johnson R-TX -- 22
Rep. Jones R-NC 
-- 18
Rep. Kasich R-OH 
-- 18
Rep. Kingston R-GA 
-- 20
Rep. Knollenberg R-MI 
-- 16
Rep. Kolbe R-AZ 
-- 22
Rep. LaHood R-IL 
-- 14
Rep. Latham R-IA 
-- 18
Rep. LaTourette R-OH 
-- 18
Rep. Leach R-IA 
-- 30
Rep. Lewis R-KY 
-- 16
Rep. Linder R-GA 
-- 18
Rep. LoBiondo R-NJ 
-- 18
Rep. Lucas R-OK 
-- 17
Rep. Manzullo R-IL 
-- 20
Rep. McCollum R-FL 
-- 20
Rep. McCrery R-LA 
-- 22
Rep. McKeon R-CA 
-- 20
Rep. McNulty D-NY 
-- 20
Rep. Meehan D-MA 
-- 15
Rep. Mica R-FL 
-- 20
Rep. Moorhead R-CA 
-- 24
Rep. Myrick R-NC 
-- 18
Rep. Nussle R-IA 
-- 16
Rep. Packard R-CA 
-- 18
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Rep. Peterson D-MN -- 22
Rep. Pombo R-CA -- 14
Rep. Portman R-OH 2 13
Rep. Pryce R-OH -- 16
Rep. Radanovich R-CA -- 16
Rep. Ramstad R-MN -- 18
Rep. Regula R-OH -- 36
Rep. Rohrabacher R-CA -- 24
Rep. Rose D-NC -- 24
Rep. Ros-Lehtinen R-FL -- 24
Rep. Roth R-WI -- 18
Rep. Royce R-CA -- 20
Rep. Saxton R-NJ -- 26
Rep. Schaefer R-CO -- 16
Rep. Shadegg R-AZ -- 16
Rep. Shaw R-FL -- 26
Rep. Shuster R-PA -- 28
Rep. Smith R-TX -- 26
Rep. Solomon R-NY -- 20
Rep. Souder R-IN -- 16
Rep. Spence R-SC -- 31
Rep. Stearns R-FL -- 24
Rep. Stump R-AZ -- 26
Rep. Talent R-MO 6 8
Rep. Tauzin D-LA -- 26
Rep. Taylor R-NC -- 16
Rep. Thomas R-CA -- 28
Rep. Thornberry R-TX -- 18
Rep. Tiahrt R-KS -- 16
Rep. Traficant D-OH -- 18
Rep. Upton R-MI -- 26
Rep. Vucanovich R-NV -- 14
Rep. Walker R-PA -- 20
Rep. Walsh R-NY -- 20
Rep. Wamp R-TN -- 16
Rep. Weldon R-FL -- 14
8272012]
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Rep. Weldon R-PA -- 20
Rep. Weller R-IL -- 14
Rep. Whitfield R-KY -- 18
Rep. Wilson R-TX -- 24
Rep. Wolf R-VA -- 32
Rep. Young R-AK -- 40
Rep. Young R-FL -- 42
CONGRESSIONAL TERM LIMITS
APPENDIX G316
THE NINE SENATORS WHO VOTED IN SUPPORT OF S.J. RES. 21 AND
SERVED No MORE THAN TWELVE YEARS317
Member Party Senate House Reason for Serving No
& Service Service More Than 12 Years
State (Years) (Years)
Unsuccessful candidate for
Sen. Abraham R-MI 6 -- reelection
Unsuccessful candidate for
Sen. Ashcroft R-MO 6 -- reelection
Sen. Coverdell R-GA 8 Died in office
Unsuccessful candidate for
Sen. Faircloth R-NC 6 -- reelection
Honored pledge to serve only
Sen. Frist R-TN 12 -- two terms
Unsuccessful candidate for
Sen. Grams R-MN 6 2 reelection
Sen. R-ID 6 Elected Governor of Idaho
Kempthorne
Sen. R-TN 8 -- Not a candidate for reelection
Thompson
Sen. Wellstone D-MN 11 -- Died in office
316 The data in Appendices G, H, and I were compiled by the Author using roll
call votes in favor of Senate Joint Resolution 21, U.S. SEN., LEGIS. & RECORDS: ROLL
CALL VOTE, ON THE CLOTURE MOTION (CLOTURE MOTION ON THE COMMITTEE
SUBSTITUTE S.J. RES. 21) (1996), available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
rollcall_lists/roll_callvotecfm.cfm?congress=104&session= 2 &vote=0 0 07 9 #position,
and an online database of Congressional biographies, THE BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF U.S. CONG., supra note 314.
s" Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee was the only Senator who voted in support of
S.J. Res. 21 and then honored a prior term limits pledge. See U.S. SEN., supra note
316; BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF U.S. CONG., supra note 314; see also Alan K. Ota,
Frist, Feeling Post-Election Blues, Abandons 2008 White House Bid, 64 CQ WKLY.
3237, 3237 (2006).
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APPENDIX H
THE FORTY-EIGHT SENATORS WHO VOTED IN SUPPORT OF S.J.
RES. 21 AND SERVED MORE THAN TWELVE YEARS IN CONGRESS,
AND THEIR TOTAL NUMBER OF YEARS OF SERVICE IN EACH
CHAMBER
Senate House
Member Party-State Service Service
(Years) (Years)
Sen. Bennett R-UT 18 --
Sen. Bond R-MO 24 --
Sen. Burns R-MT 18 --
Sen. Campbell R-CO 12 6
Sen. Chafee R-RI 23 --
Sen. Coats R-IN 8 12
Sen. Cochran R-MS 34 5
Sen. Cohen R-ME 18 6
Sen. Craig R-ID 18 10
Sen. D'Amato R-NY 18 --
Sen. DeWine R-OH 14 8
Sen. Dole R-KS 28 8
Sen. Domenici R-NM 36 --
Sen. Exon D-NE 18 --
Sen. Feinstein D-CA 21 --
Sen. Gorton R-WA 18 --
Sen. Graham D-FL 18 --
Sen. Gramm R-TX 18 6
Sen. Grassley R-IA 32 6
Sen. Gregg R-NH 18 8
Sen. Hatch R-UT 36 --
Sen. Hatfield R-OR 30 --
Sen. Helms R-NC 30 --
Sen. Hutchison R-TX 20 --
Sen. Inhofe R-OK 18 8
Sen. Jeffords R-VT 18 14
Sen. Kassebaum R-KS 20 --
Sen. Kohl D-WI 24 --
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Sen. Kyl R-AZ 18 8
Sen. Lott R-MS 24 16
Sen. Lugar R-IN 36 --
Sen. Mack R-FL 12 6
Sen. McCain R-AZ 30 --
Sen. McConnell R-KY 28 --
Sen. Murkowski R-AK 22 --
Sen. Nickles R-OK 24 --
Sen. Pressler R-SD 18 4
Sen. Roth R-DE 33 3
Sen. Santorum R-PA 12 4
Sen. Shelby R-AL 25* 8
Sen. Simpson R-WY 18 --
Sen. Smith R-NH 13 6
Sen. Snowe R-ME 17* 16
Sen. Specter R-PA 30 --
Sen. Stevens R-AK 40 --
Sen. Thomas R-WY 12 6
Sen. Thurmond R-SC 48 --
Sen. Warner R-VA 30 --
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